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Jack Mundey
Towards New Union Militancy
In what ways do you regard recent industrial activity by your union 
as a new development?
The strike was longer, involvement greater and direct confronta­
tion sharper than in most recent disputes. The assaults on partially 
completed buildings where employers attempted to use building 
tradesmen or other scab labor to smash the strike was a particularly 
new ingredient. We stated that if, in this scattered and fragmented 
industry, an employer used scab labor he must bear the full conse­
quences. Arising from this private property was smashed where 
arrogant employers ignored the democratic decisions of mass meet­
ings. It was this destruction of private property which struck 
fear to the very hearts of the employing class. If a relatively small 
union could successfully mount such an attack, what could be 
achieved by the mpre powerful unions with more resources if they 
acted in a similar way!
Jack Mundey is NSW secretary of the Builders Laborers Federation, and a mem­
ber of the National Committee of the Communist Party. He gave this interview 
to ALR  in Julv.
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You speak of “destruction" rather than “occupation” which many 
on the left consider to be the main thing.
That is specific to the industry —  there seems little point in the 
occupation of empty shells and still less of continuing building 
activity during a strike. In production and services (the nurses 
for example) the situation will differ, while in administration (the 
university for example) it will differ again.
What was the degree of involvement in the strike?
For our industry it was quite high. It was possible to hold 
the attendances at meetings at a high level —  1200 in the fifth 
week in Sydney, and the best ever attendances in Newcastle and 
Wollongong; 250 or more were engaged in consistent activity, which 
moreover was of a high quality in the vigilante groups, the number 
of which increased as the strike went on. These numbers should 
be seen in the light of the turnover in our union —  50% of the 
membership changes every year, yet we were able to hold them in 
the strike.
Another feature of involvement was the street demonstrations in 
which our members held the streets against the attempts of the 
police to move them onto the footpaths. This was another blow 
for the view that the streets are for the use of people and not just 
for commercial activity and military parades and that kind of “law 
and order".
What do you think was the inspiration for this heightened militancy? 
Did it come from overseas, or locally, or both?
I believe a combination of international developments and purely 
national and local issues influenced leaders and rank and file. 
Many workers have been impressed by the aggressive forms of 
strike and militant activities in overseas countries. The events in 
France and Italy, and in Japan, and in some of the initiatives of the 
Black Power movement in the United States have impressed. The 
activities of the students in many countries including Australia 
have also made an impact and been appreciated by advanced work­
ers.
The post-O'Shea period and the release, to a certain degree, from 
the stultifying restrictions of the penal powers has been particularly
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important. Ihe harshness of the treatment of the lower paid 
worker in this first phase of the scientific and technological revo­
lution, where he has fared much worse than any others, is a further 
reason for heightened militancy and a feeling that change can 
be achieved if we act.
You rate the penal powers struggle of May ’69 very highly?
I regard it as decisive in cracking the sense of frustration which 
was becoming universal among workers. The way it worked was 
that when a group of workers was involved in a struggle (and I 
could give many examples), after a few days or a week an array 
of union officials ranging from extreme right to extreme left would 
turn up and urge them, in different ways, to do the same thing —  
return to work to avoid the penal powers being slapped on the 
whole union or body of unions involved. The “left” officials 
usually justified this as being “in the interests of the class as a 
whole” as against those of the few score or few hundred workers 
actually involved. This may have been true in some periods and 
instances, but it became a habit and an excuse. There was too 
much readiness to settle rather than set out to win disputes.
The other side of all this was that union activity became increas­
ingly embroiled in arbitration, and no real perspective was held 
or put forward for knocking over the whole arbitration and penal 
powers treadmill. Another aspect was that struggles have been 
fragmented. For example, there has been no combined strike of 
workers in the building industry since 1957.
You spoke of the scientific and technological revolution. How 
does this affect building workers?
Naturally much less than in some industries. It is hard vo 
envisage building being basically computerised or automated in 
the forseeable future. Nevertheless technical change is extensive—  
use of glass, aluminium, preformed concrete, prefabricated sections, 
new methods of placing concrete on site (cranes, pumps, etc.) are 
being increasingly used on homes as well as in commercial and 
industrial building. Little wood is now used in the latter, and less 
is also being used in homes, so the number of versatile tradesmen 
employed in building, especially carpenters, is decreasing rapidly, 
most of those remaining being form workers (for concrete).
3
C 0 9 0 0 5 5 7 5 5 1
Certainly; it emphasises the need for it— for a real industrial 
unionism tree from craft hangovers, and with the laborers being 
accepted as a real force in the industry, not just as assistants. 
There are now 11 unions in the building industry, with many 
classifications in each. (The BLF has five classifications, and we 
are out to reduce the number.) The aim is especially to ensure 
that the lower paid workers improve their position relatively. Our 
agreement for settlement in the recent dispute is that the lowest 
paid will get no less than 90% of the increase of the highest paid. 
I would say that in the future industrial union the difference in 
rates between the lowest and the highest should be no more than 
20%.
Does (his have any bearing on the issue of industrial unionism?
What books, writings, discussions, etc., have particularly stimulated 
your thinking on all these matters?
That is very hard indeed to answer. As a struggle develops it 
is not a particular book or books that promotes thinking. In 
today’s shrinking world there are many cross-currents at work in 
the industrial and political movement, so it is a combination of 
writings from various viewpoints that influences thinking along 
with the experiences of the struggle itself. Speaking personally, 
the struggles in France in 1968 and the varied reports on them, and 
the CPA pre-Congress and Congress discussions and decisions cer­
tainly stimulated me and encouraged the style of offensive strike 
ion developed in our struggle.
What problems have you encountered in striving to develop such 
militant activity (a) among militant-inclined workers themselves,
(b) from other forces in the industrial movement, (c) from “the 
public” generally?
I should point out the general difficulty created by the very 
scattered nature of the building industry. In regard to (a) I have 
already referred to the problems created among militant workers by 
the arbitration-mindedness that developed. Most militant workers 
have been critical for years of the general passivity displayed in 
strikes, and the failure of communists and others on the left to 
really force the issues. As I have said the frustration arose particu­
larly because of the bowing down to penal powers, or even the 
threat of penal powers. These workers found it difficult to differ-
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cntiate who was who, who was left, right, or centre when all urged 
return to work when it came to the prospect of a longer strike.
(b) The left in the industrial movement in the main supported our 
tactics, though there were forebodings that “occupation” and 
“destruction of private property” were “going, a bit too far”. Some 
conservative members of the CPA considered the action was “left 
adventurist”. The rightwing made no secret of their distaste for 
the strike, and their attitude to alleged violence and the threatened 
use of the Crimes Act was almost identical with Askin’s, the 
employers’, the newspaper editors’ and the police.
(c) Because of the publicity, there was a sharp and mixed 
reaction. Controversy raged and our experience was that opinions 
was pretty evenly divided. My own impression is that younger 
people tended to support our positive approach, while older people 
were more status quo-ish and against confrontation. There was a 
general sympathy however for the lower paid worker, the battler, 
and his difficulty, in raising a family.
Is there anything in the criticisms that have been raised —  of 
adventurism; of waging a too-prolonged strike; of deliberate damage 
to property; of co«rcing others who didn’t agree with the strike; 
of introducing foreign concepts like “workers’ control”?
The accusation of adventurism was used by the Sydney Morning 
Herald in its editorial when it urged the membership to reject the 
leadership: “The State Secretary of the union, Mr. Mundey, a 
leading member of the Communist Party, seems to be out to make 
a name for himself and his party in an extreme and adventurist 
manner. His union followers should consider where he is leading 
them before it is too late.” (May 29.) There are also older trade 
union leaders, including on the left, who expressed the same senti­
ment.
As I have said, I think tactics in strikes, particularly since 1949, 
have been so tailored as to give a high priority to the penal 
powers threat, and thus the need to “get them back to wprk” to 
avoid fines. The general idea among officials was to try to win 
strikes quickly, and failing that, to beat a retreat and make the 
best of it. With the removal of some of the teeth from the penal 
f.bwers in May ’69, longer strikes including general strikes are 
likely to become the order of the day. Real economic and political 
gains are achieved when industry is brought to a halt. Lightning 
strikes and guerrilla tactics at job level have their place, but when 
the crunch comes it is the ability of the union to “stop everything”
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that can forcc a strike victory at a higher level. Our crunch came 
in the second week, when tradesmen were beginning to be stood 
down and there was a move tor conferences and a "responsible" 
approach of settlement through negotiations. At this stage there 
was little preparedness by the Master Builders to concede anything 
substantial. But when the laborers disappointed their expectations 
lor return based on previous experience and the above pressures 
within the union movement, they got a big shock. They got an 
even bigger one from the vigilante groups, and so they had to 
change their tune. I believe they would have succumbed earlier 
(many did, concluding individual agreements with us based on 
paying what we wanted) had it not been for pressure from govern­
ments and other groups of employers more powerful than the Master 
Builders.
Deliberate damage to property was the most controversial aspect 
of the strike. It was also the one that worried the employers most 
of all. We did not set out on a wanton destruction rampage, 
but attacked only buildings where employers were attempting to 
use scab labor to break the strike. This had a devastating effect 
on employers, government and police alike. In this dispute it took 
the class enemy by surprise. Future action of this type will be 
most successful if hundreds and thousands of strikers are involved, 
so making it difficult for full police and government defence of the 
employers’ property. The scattered nature of the building industry 
was an advantage here, as the vigilante groups were very mobile 
and could strike quickly.
The accusation of coercing others who didn't agree with the 
strike is largely untrue. It surprised many experienced union 
leaders that in a casual industry such as ours we could maintain 
the involvement of so many in a five week strike. In fact the 
tendency was for attendances at mass meetings to increase. The 
vigilante groups had their main development in the fourth and 
fifth weeks of the dispute. The decisions of numerous mass meet­
ings in Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong and Goulburn were either 
unanimous or overwhelmingly in favor of continued action. These 
demonstrations of determination obliged us to stop the small number 
of tradesmen and non-unionists from performing our work. There 
was little criticism from other unions of our right to stop scabbing, 
thouph some more faint-hearted union officials were critical of our 
forceful methods of backing up democratic decisions of our striking 
members.
Of workers' control, again there was some criticism from the 
more rigid on the left, particularly some members of the CPA, 
to the effect that the whole exercise was “left adventurist” as well
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as there being "nothing new" in the conduct of the strike. It was 
even suggested that it was an “Aarons' plot" to demonstrate part 
implementation of the recent Congress decisions and "embarrass" 
the “opposition" in the CPA! The emphasis on offensive strikes 
as against the usual “go home and stay home” strike allows an 
element of workers’ control to exist. For example occupation and 
continued production could give workers a practical demonstration 
of their potential capacity to run industry.
What was gained by the strike, economically and otherwise?
The margins element of the wage was increased and a new 
standard established. The widening gap between tradesmen and 
laborers was greatly reduced. This was a victory over the employers’ 
policy, applied especially in the metal trades margins struggle of 
1967-68, where the tradesmen got $7.40— quite a substantial 
increase— while the rest of the workers, the great majority, got 
very little. Our strike has helped the whole class to smash these 
plans to buy off a minority section while making more than com­
pensating profits from the low wages of the majority.
It is sometimes said that there are really no economic gains for 
the workers in such strikes. For example in this case it might 
be said that even' with 100%  victory it will take the workers a year 
to get back the wages they lest in the five weeks.
This argument is fallacious. Everything in the capitalist system 
goes against the workers if left to itself. If we don’t struggle 
inflation will reduce our wages each year anyway, and we would 
never get it back, while the employers would grow richer and more 
powerful. The losses of the employers were far greater than ours—  
$60 million is their conservative estimate— and they have therefore 
learned that they must look on the laborers, with their newly 
developed strike experience, as a force to be reckoned with. This 
will help us to win further gains in future. I have already referred 
to the general economic gains for the class as a whole which is 
likely to flow from our struggle.
Other gains include increased financial unionism, and the possi­
bility of the building unions now exercising a greater say in the 
industry. More broadly still, the workers— especially those most 
involved— developed their self-action and the consciousness that 
militancy needs to be displayed in the political and moral fields as 
well as industrially and economically. This will especially assist 
our objective of getting a big involvement in the September Vietnam  
Moratorium.
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Do you see any weaknesses in the strike?
At the conclusion of the strike we called the wives together. We 
should have done this in the beginning. Other organisational prob­
lems were the neglect of finance raising in the concentration on 
vigilante activity. Another weakness is that there hasn’t been a 
real analysis by all building unions in NSW of future industrial 
relations within the building industry. We propose to request other 
building unions to discuss our strike and future industrial relations 
as they see them as we enter the 70’s.
What dro you see as needed for further development of militant 
activity and its closer connection with aspirations for revolutionary 
change in society?
A complete reorientation of the left in the movement towards 
direct confrontation on a wider scale and with wider horizons, and 
away from purely wages and conditions struggles. The failure in 
peace activity, in all anti-war struggles, is the immediate main prob­
lem the unions must tackle. Direct intervention in the control of 
industries, in social problems, price controls is a must if unions are 
to win younger people and reverse the drift away from unionism.
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Peter Wiley
America's 'Pacific Rim' Strategy
THE REASONS FOR DISSENSION among America’s rulers are 
clear. The war has destroyed the precious consensus while threat­
ening to undermine the economy. Besides the threat to the dollar 
particularly from European bankers, rising inflation, and a worsen­
ing balance of payments situation —  all aggravated by an economy 
fired up by military expenditures —  the very foundation of Ameri­
can international expansion, the superior productivity of the U.S. 
economy, has been eroded.
For more than a hundred years the United States has been a 
Pacific power. But since the end of World War II and the 
collapse of the British, French and Japanese empires, the United 
States has become the major Pacific power.1 While the industrial 
nations remain the the largest trading centre for the United States 
and U.S. investment is increasing in Europe twice as fast as in the 
Pacific, trade is increasing in the Pacific faster than in Europe.
U.S. imperialism in Asia has developed pecular characteristics 
which will determine the direction of future strategies in the area. 
Beginning with World War II economic thrusts have been accom­
panied and protected by an aggressive military presence. This fact 
has affected both the nature of economic relations in the Pacific 
Basin and the industrial development of the western United States. 
The United States' peculiar form of international military Keynes­
ianism has stoked up the economies of the lesser Asian powers 
as well as Japan, producing a fatal dependency on the maintenance 
of a massive military presence.
This article appeared in Leviathan (US) of June 1960, and is republished here 
slightly abridged.
Peter Wiley is a revolutionary activist and member of the San Francisco staff of
/ n ’iathav.
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li is a matter of common knowledge that defence spending has 
provided much of the dynamism for the American economy since 
World War U. With much of this spending going to maintain an 
American presence in Asia, military imperialism in Asia has played 
a significant role in the rapid expansion and internationalisaton of 
the American economy. And now since the United States com­
mitted itself to intervention in Vietnam, the very institutions which 
were generated by this expansion, particularly the multinational 
corporation, have begun to devise an imperial strategy consistent 
both with the traditions of U.S. imperialism in Asia and with the 
global scope of their search for markets and resources. Beginning 
on the mainland of Southeast Asia, the corporations in the van­
guard of the movement for rationalisation and extension of the 
Pacific market are beginning to systematise and integrate the complex 
web of bilateral, multilateral and regional alliances which have been 
constructed in the Pacific since the war.
VIETNAM
The formulation of a Pacific Rim strategy contributed to a 
clarification and alteration of the role assigned to Vietnam. In 
1966 the United States saw Vietnam as another Greece or Korea. 
Upon successful completion of pacification, U.S. capital would 
move in and reconstruct the country tying its economy to the 
international market system. Henry M. Sperry, Vice-President of 
First National City Bank, outlined this strategy:
We believe that w ere going to win this war. Afterwards you'll have a major 
job of reconstruction on your hands. That will take financing and financing 
means hanks . . .  It would he illogical to permit the English and French to 
monopolise the hanking business^!,—cKHse South Vietnam's economy is becoming 
more and more I nited States oriented.
American corporations as well as banks were already staking out 
their claims. Standard Oil, Caltex and Shell, for example, were 
working on a $19 million oil refinery. Vietnam was being con­
sidered as more than a market for U.S. investments and a place 
where American-owned subsidiaries would purchase goods from 
parent plants in the United States. By reconstructing agriculture, 
particularly rice cultivation, Vietnam could resume its special role 
in the economy of the region by supplying rice to countries with 
serious food shortages.
Although the Tet offensive of 1968 destroyed these plans by 
driving, the United States out of the countryside and into a few 
cities and fortified bases, the United States has no intention of 
withdrawing. As long as the United States is militarily incapable 
of pacifying Vietnam, it must accept second best. Rather than a
in A U S T R A L IA N  LEFT R EV IEW — AUG.-SEPT., 1970
politico-economic entity integrated into the Pacific economy, Vietnam 
is being developed as a military outpost, a key base in the defence 
perimeter which runs along, the edge of the Asian continent and 
is anchored in South Korea and Vietnam. Former Special Assistant 
to the Secretary of State Graham Martin has described the United 
States as creating a “protective screen” in Southeast Asia. Bases 
like Cam Ranh Bay, recognised by all observers as a permanent 
facility, will anchor this screen.
THAILAND AND INDONESIA
Behind this screen the United States is rapidly expanding its 
influence in Southeast Asia, focussing its attention primarily on 
Thailand and Indonesia. Thailand is considered “the centre of 
political and economic stability in Southeast Asia”. In a real 
sense the United States is fighting in Vietnam to protect its interests 
in Thailand from the forces of revolutionary nationalism repre­
sented by the recently formed (January, 1969) People’s Liberation 
Army of Thailand. With Vietnam lost except as a military outpost, 
the United States is trying to bring Thailand into the Pacific 
economy before the struggle there reaches the proportions of Viet­
nam. Between 1961 and 1967 the United States bolstered the 
military dictatorship of General Thonom Kittikachom with $640 
million in aid, almost two-thirds of it military assistance. In return 
the Thai Government reversed a tendency toward state control of 
the economy and opened the country to American investment and 
to the investment of important U.S. allies like Japan. The govern­
ment provided tax holidays and guarantees against nationalisation 
and against restrictions on entry of foreign capital, repatriation of 
profits, and transfer of capital. In 1965 the Department of Com­
merce listed 99 firms in which American companies or individuals 
have a substantial direct capital investment in the form of stock, 
as, a sole owner, or as a partner. Present U.S. investment is 
estimated at $195 million, with much more to come. Among the 
important investors are Caltex, Chase Manhatten Bank, Esso, Fire­
stone Rubber, IBM, ITT, Foremost Dairies, Bank of America and 
Kaiser Aluminium. The last three are important West Coast firms.
American firms are primarily interested in Thailand’s raw mat­
erials. Thus Tenneco and Union Oil signed the first contract for 
exploration and future exploitation of the oil fields under the Gulf 
of Thailand, while Standard of Indiana has constructed a $35 
million refinery. Union Carbide has invested $4.8 million to extract 
tin concentrate and Goodyear has built three tyre plants to tap 
Thailand’s extensive rubber supplies. Meanwhile large U.S. banks 
— Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust, First National City, Morgan Guar­
anty and Banker’s Trust— are moving into Thai finance.
I I
Two other forms of economic activity are significant. Many 
large Japanese and American corporations are taking advantage of 
their increased international character in order to locate labor 
intensive industries and parts plants in areas where labor is cheap. 
In this way consumer goods and light manufactures can be produced 
cheaply and exported to domestic assembly plants. Parts can also 
be assembled abroad for the local market. Another type of activity 
is the actual construction of the defence perimeter. Utah Mining 
and Construction, a large international firm located in San Fran­
cisco. is building military bases in Thailand which are being used 
to bomb Vietnam. Utah’s involvement in the military aspects of 
U.S. expansion in the region in instructive. Marriner Eccles, 
chairman of the board, has been a vocal critic of the war in Vietnam, 
a fact that has not prevented Utah from contributing to its extension.
Beyond Thailand is Indonesia, one of the richest regions and 
largest single markets in the world. American companies have 
literally swarmed into Indonesia since the coup against Sukarno 
although the chaotic, state of the economy has proved a significant 
barrier to investment. President Eisenhower explained the relation­
ship between the struggle in Vietnam and Indonesia as early as 
1953 when he asked, “If we lost Vietnam and Malaya, how would 
we. the free world, hold the rich empire of Indonesia?"
Since large-scale U.S. intervention in Vietnam, Indonesia has been 
redeemed for the “free world’’. With the coup against Sukarno in 
1966 the trend of growing hostility toward foreign capital was 
arrested and a more pliable government “came into existence’". 
Within six months of its advent the new government returned 
expropriated property to its former owners and promulgated a new 
law on foreign investment. The law provides virtual exemption 
from taxation for new foreign investors and makes no provision for 
joint ventures, one method which is usually employed in an effort 
to retain some local control of foreign investors. President Suharto 
summed up the attitude of the new government toward foreign 
investors when he reassured Prime Minister Sato of Japan that 
Indonesia will “never interfere in the affairs of private business 
organisation in Indonesia."
Soon after the coup and the counter-revolutionary bloodbath 
which killed hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, the United 
States extended aid to the new regime. Aid is now being followed 
by the preliminary forays of American investors. American Free­
port Sulphur is opening a $76.5 million copper mine while U.S. 
Steel. Bethlehem, Kaiser Aluminium (among others) are also inter­
ested. American oil companies are just beginning to investigate
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Indonesia's rich deposits although they are still hampered by a 
residue of nationalism from the Sukarno regime; the government 
insists on receiving 65 per cent of the net returns. Fifteen Ameri­
can banks, including Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and First 
National City have received authorisation to open offices. They 
are participating in the formation of a national investment bank 
which will give them a large measure of control over Indonesian 
finances.
Raw materials bring most investors to Indonesia and the economy 
is well on its way to becoming an extractive industry-plantation 
type of neo-colony. Although the Dutch were able to explore only 
a tenth of Indonesian resources, and the Sukarno regime did not 
get much further, potential investors know that the islands abound 
with oil. tin, copper and many other important materials as well as 
timber and the most fertile lands in Asia. By the middle of 1968 
the government approved foreign investment projects totalling 
$332.08 million, with a five year goal of $2.5 billion. More than 
three-quarters of these projects were concentrated in mining, planta­
tions, forestry, and fishing. Projects totalling $57.8 million were 
approved for manufacturing. Of the total amount a little over a 
third were U.S. investments and the next two investors were listed as 
Canadian and South Korean, but the companies are in fact subsi­
diaries of U.S. corporations. Thus, almost two-thirds of the planned 
investment in Indonesia will be American-owned.
JAPAN
Although our attention is concentrated on Vietnam and Southeast 
Asia due to the prolonged military confrontation there, Japan is 
in fact the pivot of the United States' economic and military offen­
sive in Asia. Japan, and island bases like Okinawa, have been the 
most important forward staging areas in two U.S. interventions, 
Korea and Vietnam. Japan is industrialised, seemingly stable poli­
tically, and' often a willing partner in U.S. expansionist designs. 
Japan is the second largest market in the world after Canada 
for U.S. goods, the largest market for U.S. agricultural goods, and 
an important target for U.S. investors and exporters who so far have 
been prevented from penetrating the Japanese economy like they 
have the European.
But Japan presents a problem and the solution of the problem 
is perhaps one of the most important reasons for the United States’ 
continuing presence in Southeast Asia. Japan is an island economy 
with a small resource base, a rapidly growing population, and a 
domestic market that is limited in relation to the rapidly expanding 
productive capacity of its modern economy. In order to keep up
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its present rate of economic growth it must have larger and larger 
foreign markets and supplies of raw materials. Because of the 
importance of Japan to the United States in the Pacific, the United 
States, since the occupation, has assumed a great deal of responsibility 
for managing the expansion of the Japanese economy as well as its 
own. Eisenhower explained in 1954 that the loss of Indochina 
“would take away that region Japan must have as a trading area, 
or it would force Japan to turn toward China and Manchuria, 
or toward the Communist areas in order to live. The possible 
consequences of the loss of Japan to the free world are just incal­
culable”.
The possibility of reorientation toward China and Russia is 
strong if not "natural". China and Russia are Japan’s logical 
trading partners for reasons of transportation cost and economic 
specialisation. Prewar Japanese imperialism was based largely on 
the complementary nature of the Japanese and Chinese economies. 
China provided a market for Japanese textiles and industrial goods 
and at the same time supplied important raw materials like cotton, 
iron ore, and coal while helping to feed the Japanese population 
with rice and soya. Ideology and pressures from the United States 
have not prevented the Japanese from trying to re-establish this 
trade pattern since the Cold War. Trade grew rapidly in the 
fifties, was slowed down by Chinese political opposition in the late 
fifties, and began to pick up again until the Cultural Revolution. 
The future of Sino-Japanese relations is unsure at this point although 
Japanese businessmen feel that trade with China this year will 
pick up perhaps equalling the record level of 1966. In addition 
Japan in involved in several joint ventures with Russia in eastern 
Siberia designed to develop the resources of the area.
The United States is clearly wary lest Japan first reorient its 
trade policy and then follow this change with a more independfent 
political stance in all of Asia. To prevent this reorientation the 
United States is encouraging Japan to re-establish its relationship 
with the Southeast Asian region of its former East Asian Copros­
perity Sphere, while directing the rest of its overseas economic 
activities toward the West. Southeast Asia is already providing 
important raw materials for Japanese industry (bauxite from Thai­
land, oil from Indonesia) and will provide more in the future as 
long as the Southeast Asia countries are amenable to the exploitation 
of their resources by the new and old colonial masters. Until 
recently, however, the region did not live up to Japan’s expectations 
as a market for goods and investment. Japan turned instead to 
the United States, Canada and Australia and began to develop 
new markets and sources of raw materials in Latin America. 
Japanese foreign investment in the “underdeveloped” countries is
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presently shifting away from Latin America and toward Southeast 
Asia, particularly the United States’ neo-colonial dependencies, 
Taiwan. Korea and Thailand. Despite this shift, 26 per cent of 
Japanese foreign investment in 1968 was in Latin America while 
only 14 per cent was in other Asian countries.
Significantly, the United States has provided a surrogate market 
for Japan in Asia which helps to keep Japan out of the Chinese 
or Soviet trade orbit. From 1945 to 1962 U.S. military expenditures 
in Japan contributed significantly to the GNP and paid for nearly 
20 per cent of Japanese imports, a very important factor in a 
country which until the recent boom has had chronic balance of 
payments problems due to the necessity to import large quantities 
of goods. In addition, U.S. military involvement has provided the 
markets that Japan needs in the “underdeveloped” countries of Asia. 
The Japanese economy has thrived off the export of goods to Korea, 
Vietnam, Thailand and other American outposts. The impact of 
the escalation of U.S. military involvement on the Asian mainland 
can be illustrated both by the Korean war which initiated the 
Japanese economic “miracle” and by the way the economy began 
to accelerate with the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. In 
1965-66 the GNP rose 2.7 per cent, in 1966-67, in comparison, it 
rose by 7.5 per cent, reaching a fantastic 10 per cent in 1968.
The relationship between the tempo of Japanese economic devel­
opment and U.S. military involvement is more complicated than a 
simple accelerating effect from the U.S. military expenditures in 
Japan and Asia. Both the Korean and Vietnamese interventions 
caused rapid upswings in the U.S. domestic economy, the largest 
market for Japanese goods, which in turn stimulated the Japanese 
economy. In general, Japanese economic health is tied in large 
part to U.S. military adventures.
THE STRATEGY
The corporations in the forefront of Pacific economic expansion 
see the development of a Pacific Rim strategy as the key to 
orienting Southeast Asia and Japan toward the West and integrating 
them into a market system under U.S. hegemony. Operating 
through their research arm, the Stanford Research Institute, these 
corporations (Kaiser, Union Oil, Bechtel, Bank of America, Castle 
and Cook, Utah Construction and Mining, and Tenneco, to name 
a few) began to articulate a conscious strategy beginning in 1967 
as an outgrowth of their expanded activities in the area.
At the core of the Pacific system, as they see it, are the advanced 
industrial nations, Japan and the United States, and the three 
industrialising nations, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The
15
greater part of the How of trade and investment is between these 
countries and is based on a certain degree of specialisation. The 
United States trades with all the nations exporting a wide variety 
of goods, most important of which are raw materials, agricultural 
goods, consumer durables and capital goods. In addition the 
United States has invested and will continue to invest in all the 
Asian countries, with particular emphasies on Australia and Japan, 
where direct U.S. investment is presently not welcome. Australia 
and to a lesser extent New Zealand export raw materials and 
agricultural goods largely to Japan. In Australia, raw materials in 
particular arc being developed for sale in Japan with Japanese 
and American capital. Japan produces textiles and a great variety 
of consumer and capital goods for the same markets as the United 
States, while also investing wherever possible.
The United States and then Japan stand at the apex of the 
hierarchy of economic development. They draw resources from the 
next tier, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, while selling goods 
in these markets. These advanced countries, moreover, regard 
the integration of the neo-colonial countries around the Pacific 
Rim into their triangular and quadrilateral economic relations as 
essential to the future development of an international division of 
labor in the Pacific. First, because the neo-colonial countries arc 
at a very low level of development, their growth could be spectacular 
and their potential as markets far greater than advanced countries. 
Sccond, the advanced countries view the raw materials of these 
countries as increasingly important to their economic well-being. 
SRI-International Vice-President Ed Robison explained, “The 
raw materials that enable the rich countries to grow richer must 
increasingly be bought from the poor. The industrialised nations 
are using these basic materials in geometrically increasing quantities.
. . . We are . . . forced to scour the world to find out sources. . .” 
Finally, Southeast Asia and Latin America have a special sig­
nificance. as we have described, for the United States' ally, Japan.
The need to “scour the world” for raw materials has provided 
the impetus for bringing western Latin America and western Canada 
into the Pacific pattern of trade, tying the eastern Pacific to the 
western Pacific. The United States has been exploiting the resources 
of both Canada and western Latin American countries like Chile and 
Peru for quite a while. Now elaborate international agreements are 
being made in conjunction with Japan to expand these operations 
in order to meet Japan’s soaring needs for raw materials.
The activities of Utah Mining and Construction, a major Pacific 
Rim corporation and affiliate of SRI, are typical of the complex 
international relationships developing around the Pacific Rim be­
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tween the Uniled States and Japan. Utah owns a controlling share 
of Marcona Mining. Marcona invested in the exploitation of iron 
ore in Peru in 1956. Now the ore is exported to Japan in ships 
constructed for Marcona in Japanese shipyards. The ships then 
move on to Indonesia and the Persian Gulf, returning to the West 
Coast of the United States with oil. In 1967, Marcona began 
exporting alumina from western Canada with a fleet of Japanese- 
built ships. In Australia, Utah is embarking on a joint venture 
with Mitsubishi, one of Japan’s corporate giants. Together they 
have paid SI 12 million (Utah put up 85 per cent of the capital) 
to explore 1333 square miles in Queensland for coal. The coal 
will be moved to the coast on a railroad built by the Government 
of Queensland and will then be shipped to Japan in Japanese-built 
ships. When Utah’s construction of military bases in Thailand is 
taken into account we have a full picture of an expansive Pacific 
Rim corporation profiting from the extension of the military 
perimeter on the Asian mainland and from the exploitation of raw 
materials behind this perimeter.
Along with the formulation of a conscious strategy for the Pacific, 
the United States has initiated or parti :ipated in a great variety of 
arrangements and institutions designed largely to “internationalise” 
protection of existing investments and facilitate further investment 
mainly in the less developed areas. Some of these arrangements are 
international in character; others serve as a convenient cover for 
U.S. control. Foremost among the institutions is the Asian Develop­
ment Bank (ADB) founded in 1966.
Another important aspect of the internationalisation involved in 
the Pacific Rim strategy is the beginnings of military involvement 
by the other advanced Pacific nations particularly in Southeast 
Asia. In January, 1969, the Japanese began to send destroyers 
from its so-called Maritime Self-Defence Force into the Malacca 
Straits between Malaysia and Indonesia. The next month Australia 
and New Zealand announced that they will maintain forces in 
Malaysia and Singapore in anticipation of British withdrawal east 
of Suez in 1971. The United States has put great emphasis on 
the internationalisation of the Vietnam intervention by forcing its 
more servile allies like South Korea to send troops. When revo­
lutionary nationalism becomes generalised in Southeast Asia, which 
is only a matter of time, the United States will have its imperialist 
co-partners at beck and call.
IMPERIALIST CUL-DE-SAC
Despite the immense sophistication of the international corpora­
tion. and the overwhelming strength of the American military state.
the success of the Pacific Rim strategy is far from a foregone con­
clusion. Indeed it is subject to pressures from without and within, 
due largely to the growth of revolutionary nationalism on the one 
hand and competition in the international economy on the other.
The consequences of the continued colonisation of the third 
world are apparent: China, Algeria, Cuba and Vietnam are all 
responses to the continued expansion of Western capitalism. At 
the same time the Western powers are incapable of learning the 
lesson of repeated defeats at the hands of revolutionary nationalism. 
This is more true in Asia than anywhere else. Through vast 
geopolitical arrangements like the Pacific Rim strategy the interna­
tional corporations are consciously generating the conditions that 
lead to revolution. SRI, for example, explains that “In the colonial 
era, the export of tropical products from Southeast Asia was a 
cornerstone of the world trading system. The demand for these 
products, and for minerals, is still increasing year by year. It is 
still true that a country gains by exporting the products in which 
it has the greatest comparative advantage”.
The kind of insistence on repeating what has been proved to be 
self-destructive is responsible for the internationalisation of the 
anti-colonial revolt in Southeast Asia. At present guerrilla struggles 
are taking place in Laos, Thailand, Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines. Some of these are just beginning (India and 
Burma), others were thought to have been terminated but are 
springing up again (Philippines and Malaysia), still others are 
emerging as major confrontations (Laos and Thailand).
Unable to deal with the conditions that breed revolutionary 
resistance, the corporations must opt for counterinsurgency, a disas­
trous course because once the struggle has sufficient roots counter­
insurgency can only contribute to its growth. In Thailand where 
guerrillas are fighting in three separate areas, the struggle has 
reached the stage where the local militias have been consolidated 
into a People’s Liberation Army. For several years the United 
States has been supplying the Thai “police” with a great variety 
of material including weapons, helicopters and patrol boats. Within 
the last two years American pilots have been “advising” Thai pilots 
on missions against the guerrillas. There are presently about 50,000  
U.S. troops in Thailand. Virtually all the elements of another 
Vietnam!
Investors in Thailand like Union Oil, Union Carbide, Kaiser, Castle 
and Cook, Bank of America, and Utah Mining and Construction 
are working through SRI for Project AGILE, the Pentagon’s world­
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wide counterinsurgency research program so that the United States 
will be in a knowledgeable position should “large-scale intervention 
in Thailand be called for” (SRI).
Another factor is China. How long will she sit by and witness 
the extension of U.S. military power along her borders? Many of 
the leading corporations active in the Pacific are eager to trade 
with China. It galls them to have to watch the Japanese and West 
Germans reaping profits from the enemy. But trade with China 
is unlikely to come while China sees larger and larger deployments 
of troops and bases on the Asian mainland. Further, China will 
undoubtedly continue to support liberation struggles in adjacent 
countries.
Besides the pressures from outside, the development of the Pacific 
Rim strategy is threatened from within, particularly by the complex 
relations between the United States and Japan. While the United 
States has fought in Southeast Asia in part to secure the area for 
Japan, Japan still remains a serious competitor. In Thailand until 
recently, for example, Japan was the largest investor. Japan is 
pursuing new markets aggressively; the director of Pacific operations 
for one of the largest American firms in the area commented re­
cently that “little by little Japan is taking over the Pacific”.
Japan’s most serious threat is in the U.S. domestic market in 
steel, autos, certain consumer goods and electronic components. 
The steel industry in particular is adamant about imposing measures, 
whether higher tariffs or quotas, which will cut down Japanese 
imports. Many corporations are caught in a dilemma. If the 
decline of the United States’ competitive position is a long-term 
trend due to factors like inflation which cannot be controlled, they 
will have no choice but to restrict imports.
U.S. corporations argue that they must restrict Japanese imports 
if Japan is not willing to reciprocate by opening the door to U.S. 
direct investments. Despite a recent token liberalisation policy, 
Japan prevents American corporations from gaining control of 
Japanese firms or from setting up subsidiaries by limiting U.S. 
investment to joint ventures controlled by Japanese capital and to 
stock market investment. The United States is eager to compete 
equally within (read dominate) the Japanese economy by setting 
up its own operations and purchasing Japanese firms. If the 
United States is allowed to Americanise the Japanese economy as 
it has the European, Japan, with its fantastic rate of growth, could 
become the major market for U.S. capital.
Faced by a variety of pressures from the United States, Japan 
might embark on a more independent course. She is already
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arming herself with destroyers, subs and American jets at the urging 
of the United States. It is forseeable that she might decide in the 
future that she can exist without living under the United States' 
nuclear umbrella, particularly if she has more amicable relations 
with countries like China who will remain hostile as long as Japan 
serves as an outpost for U.S. military adventures. The conse­
quences of splitting with the United States cannot be taken lightly. 
Besides the benefits of imperialism without militarism, Japan would 
lose the annual “subsidy" from U.S. military expenditures in Japan 
and perhaps some of the benefits of military expenditure outside 
of Japan. Japan would have to be pushed quite a ways by a 
strong trend toward protectionism in the United States and more 
adamant attempts to open the door before any fundamental change 
would take place. The seeds of the conflict do exist, however, 
and they are growing.
Finally there arc the political liabilities of an alliance with the 
United States. Japan is aware that subordination to the United 
States means inability to break out of the cycle of involvement in 
U.S. military adventures, a distinct problem for an Asian nation 
with a large, militant left. The United States and the Mutual 
Security Treaty which allows the United States to have bases in 
Japan have been a target of the left for years. Militant action 
against the huge U.S. base on Okinawa has increased in the last 
year with the return of the island to Japan as a goal. The Japanese 
and the U.S. mission seem to be in agreement at this point that a 
return of the base to Japan might be a good way to “manage” the 
confrontation which is anticipated for next year when the treaty is 
scheduled to be renewed. If the left can exert greater pressure 
on the government in the impending crisis, it may force the govern­
ment to take a more independent stand. The return of Okinawa 
and several small bases would not represent an American pull-out 
to a defence perimeter in the Philippines and Guam. Most esti­
mates are that if the United States can afford to give up the base 
in Okinawa, it will be transferred to Cam Ranh Bay.
What alternatives does corporate imperialism have in Asia? 
Withdrawal or significant disengagement simply are not feasible 
given the nature of American expansion to the East. Since 1945 
the United States has “invested" billions of dollars in aid and 
material and tens of thousands of lives in three wars (the Chinese 
civil war and the Korean and Vietnamese interventions) in order 
to maintain a presence on the Asian mainland. This fact alone 
should be indicative of U.S. intentions.
But now the corporations at the forefront of planning the Pacific 
Rim strategy are taking themselves further into a situation where
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there is less and less room to manoeuvre. Having constructed the 
southern flank of a permanent defence perimeter with its major 
bases at Cam Ranh Bay and in northern Thailand, they have defined 
the area immediately behind this perimeter beginning in Thailand 
and including Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia as vital to the 
existence of their leading ally, Japan, and as integral and essential 
to the entire Pacific Basin. The Basin in turn has been defined as 
essential to the future development of international capitalism 
because of its raw materials and its vast potential.
The propensity of the system to penetrate and attempt to incor­
porate larger and larger areas has generated an epic struggle 
against imperialism, the beginnings of which we are just witnesslnu. 
When we examine the liberation struggles in other Asian countries, 
we ought to remember that the Chinese fought for more than two 
decades for their independence and that the Vietnamese have been 
lighting now for almost three. These struggles will smoulder, 
rekindle, and flare up according to their own rhythms but they 
have reached the stage where their expansion is inevitable.
The central role of armed counter-revolution in U.S. imperialism 
in Asia is probably the most important short term factor governing 
the United States’ ability to extricate itself from Vietnam. The 
negotiations are influenced by the United States’ intent to maintain 
a permanent military presence in Southeast Asia. The military 
cannot “liberate" Vietnam. It remains to be seen if they can 
hold on to the enclaves. But they will not accept anything short 
of this.
Finally the economic consequences of a significant reduction of 
the U.S. military presence would be severe, if not disastrous. The 
economies of the Asian countries oriented toward the West have 
grown in dependency on expenditures generated by American 
interventions. If Japan would suffer from a military cut-back, 
the impact on less developed countries like Korea, Taiwan or 
Singapore would undoubtedly be more severe. Once committed 
to the generation of significant economic development by means of 
military expenditures it has become close to impossible to take 
a peaceful course even if the various Liberation fronts would allow 
it.
vVith the United States operating on the basis of the assumptions 
which have shaped the Pacific Rim strategy, the Paris talks do 
not indicate a dramatic reversal in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed 
they are simply a ploy to buy time to cool out dissent at home 
while continuing the disastrous policies of the postwar period in 
Asia.
Kevin Hartshorne
Czechoslovakia — Two Years After
TWO YEAR , AFTER the Warsaw Pact Invasion. Two years 
after 1968 beet me yet another momentous historical date for the 
sophisticated Czechs and Slovaks. Dates such as 1415, 1620, 1848, 
1918, 1938, 1945 1948. . . Czechs know their history, and no-one 
who cannot ,>£ H ate the momentous significance of such dates 
as these tc i!io o people living in ‘the cockpit of Europe’ can 
appreciate theiv m od  in 1970. For there are those of us whose 
emotional identification with certain concepts of government and 
certain ideological dogmas lead us to behave like leftwing Cham­
berlains: Czechoslovakia is a long way off, we know little about 
it, it’s a small country —  and what’s all this prattle about sover­
eignty and nationalism anyway? We’re internationalists, aren’t 
we?
1415? The Prague preacher Jan Hus was burned because he 
condemned Church corruption and refused to recant in Rome. 
His death helped set off Protestant rebellions which caused radical 
changes in central European society. To many Czechs 1415 is 
yesterday. Hus’s statue in the capital carries an inscription in old 
Cyrillic proclaiming that while it stood Czechs would always feel 
free. No-one apparently translated this for the nazis for they left 
it standing. Hus has come to symbolise national identity, national 
independence and freedom from domination by larger powers.1 
And at that time the preacher stared down Paris Street from the 
historic old Town Square at an enormous and bombastic statue
t It amazes me that the same socialists who demand that Papuans, Aborigines or 
Fijians have all these things cannot want them for Czechs or Slovaks as well, or 
for T a rta n  etc. _
Kevin Hartshorne is a High School Teacher in Victoria. He lived for many 
years in Czechoslovakia and is author of the book Czechoslovakia — From the 
Xetr World.
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of Stalin, a symbol of another kind and a constant affront to the 
feelings of the people until it was blown up.
1620? From 1620 to 1918 the Czechs (and Slovaks) were ruled 
by Austro-Hungary. 300 years of Catholicisation and Germanisa- 
tion! The Czech language held out only in the country areas 
and it was such a catastrophic period that the Czechs remember 
it as the ‘Period of Darkness’ from the title of a book by Jirasek. 
Ferdinand of Vienna won a battle near Prague and:
He determined to extirpate the Protestanl religion from Bohemia, and . . . 
(his success) has rarely been equalled in the history of persecution. By a 
system of widespread confiscation and ruthless repression the country was 
brought under the Austrian heel. A German ascendancy as intolerant as 
that of the English settlers in Ireland was imposed upon the Czechs, and 
not seriously shaken till the nineteenth century. German officials ruled . . . 
Jesuit priests controlled education . . . (and) the Bohemian peasantry was 
trodden down into serfdom . . . (So there resulted) the manufacture of a 
servile state in Europe.2
1848? The Year of Revolutions in Europe. The Czechs 
revolted too, like many a people demanding more freedom, more 
possibility of national and cultural development. But the Aus- 
trians had other ideas:
On June 17, 1848, Prince Windischgratz turned his guns upon the city of 
Prague . . . (and) postponing for seventy years the realization of Czech liber­
ties. crushed the Bohemian rebellion/!
1918? This year marked the end of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and its rule over the Czechs and Slovaks. Masaryk and 
Benes were revered as founders of the First Czechoslovak Republic. 
After 300 years Czechs and Slovaks could use their own languages 
freely, set up their own institutions and control their own destinies 
without any overlords!
1938? The story of Munich and the Western betrayal of Czecho­
slovakia to Hitler is well-known. Less well-known is that Czecho­
slovakia was already a well-fortified and modern state with a strong 
army and air force and that its people responded in 1938 in such 
overwhelming numbers, revealing that amazing ‘crisis unity’ which 
astounded the world in 1968, that Hitler would have had great 
trouble breaking through the forts had not the Munich Agreement 
simply handed him the country. There is evidence to support the 
theory that nazism could in fact have been defeated in 1938. But 
what a bitter experience, those six years of nazi domination to a
2 A History of Europe, H. A. L. Kisher: E. Arnold Sc Son, London 1936, pp.616-7.
8 op. cit., p. 922.
people who only twenty years before had been freed from three 
centuries of Austrian domination!!1
1945? Once again a Liberation, a Soviet Liberation. It is 
Irue that the Americans were in a position to liberate embattled 
Prague and the country before the Red Army and bowed out 
under an international agreement, yet moral and historical justice 
saw the Soviet forces eulogised as the true destroyer of fascism. 
Especially as treaty links dated from pre-war days, there was wide­
spread and genuine affection for the liberators.
1948? The year of decisive socialist change, the year which 
demanded that people decide which way to face, after Western 
style elections in 1946 had shown the Communist Party to be 
the major one and to be constitutionally the legitimate governing 
party.
1968? The year of the fall of Novotny, the period of the ‘Czech 
renaissance’ and the subsequent Warsaw Pact Invasion. Why all 
this turmoil in 1968? The simple answer is that it had become 
obvious to all but a few citizens that the Novotny people were then 
holding society back and that despite life having some good features 
almost every sector in society was suffering grave stagnation.
Perhaps economic failure destroyed Novotny’s power above all. 
In 1959-61 I witnessed a steady and uninterrupted rise in living 
standards in Czechoslovakia, and even though industry was carrying 
agriculture this seemed to reflect a basically sound economy. But 
in Autumn 1962 there occurred a serious economic, political and 
moral crisis. The leaders were unable to cope, their authority 
weakened rapidly and there was evidence of widespread economic 
and social dislocation, caused by power failures, food shortages, a 
sudden rise in the incidence of bribery, a nation-wide management 
breakdown and a general slump in public morale. People’s frus­
tration became so acute that even communists cursed and said 
that if this was socialism then it wasn’t much good to them. Yet 
despite an unusually severe winter the Czechs and Slovaks rallied 
and their national feeling was shown at its best in the crisis as 
production was maintained in weather more typical of Siberia than 
of Czechoslovakia.5 I felt at the time that authority was relatively 
powerless. It looked for a few days as though socialism would
1 T he Slovaks were actually ruled by the Hungarians for 1,000 years.
•"* I stress the perhaps unique importance of "national feeling" here because ! 
<lo not know of a comparable example where certain individuals who were 
known to be bitterly opposed to the ruling ideology would nevertheless make 
such prodigious efforts during a national crisis: namely, some of those individuals 
whose property had been nationalised after 1948.
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collapse from sheer inertia. I believe that had a significant number 
of people been in fact organising to destroy socialism then they 
certainly could never have chosen a moment when the system was 
more vulnerable.
However, sheer muscle and patriotism is no long-term substitute 
for necessary reforms, which was proved in 1963 when industrial 
production actually fell slightly —  almost unheard of in a developed 
country in recent years. His regime weakened, Novotny responded 
by loosening the reins a little. He gave prominence to talk about 
the ideas of economic reform of people such at Ota Sik while 
attempting to rule in the old way. He also liberalised foreign 
travel and cultural freedoms generally, to placate the intellectuals 
above all, who were his main critics." By Christmas 1964 the 
atmosphere in Prague was intoxicating because of the tremendous 
intellectual and cultural energies released, energies that had been 
held in an ideological strait-jacket since the 1950’s purges frightened 
thinking people into silence. But Novotny fell because economic 
and political problems were left unsolved. From 1964-8 the eco­
nomy just dragged miserably along; the crisis simply deepened.
The case of the Czech writer Vladimir Skutina does much to 
reveal aspects of the quality of life under Novotny and of some of 
Stalinist socialism’s worst features.7 On May 5, 1962, Skutina 
was arrested at his office in the capital. He was not charged, nor 
allowed to contact anyone, but taken immediately to a prison cell. 
He writes:
"Only when I returned home after having served my sentence did I find out 
that a second car was driven to our place and its crew behaved in prccisclv 
the same way that I had seen in war films about Gestapo raids on the homes 
of suspected anti-fascists." Skutina's wife was feeding their baby girl. They 
told her this could wait and: " . . .  as she watched they . . . seized all the 
writing they could find . . . opened every book to look for espionage m at­
erial . . . (and) threw each book on the floor . . . This abuse and occupa­
tion of my flat took eight hours . . . They didn't even tell her why I'd been 
arrested."
Skutina was charged with: ‘Lowering the dignity of the President 
of the Republic’. He writes: ‘I was supposed to have said Pre­
8 Skutina charges that Novotny ignored the Constitution, which decreed he 
submit to re-election for the Presidency in 1962. But even in 1064 he had been 
widely expected to fall, and his re-election can largely be attributed to his one 
really independent act since 1957: He criticised the methods used in the sacking 
of Krushchov, who returned front Czechoslovakia not long before his fall and 
was popular there as the de-Staliniser who had saved people such as Edouard 
Goldstucker from execution.
' The President’s Prisoner, Vladimir Skutina, this edition: North Bohemian 
Publishing Firm 1969. in Liberec. First edition in about February, 1968. Also 
appeared in translation in the USA, France, West Germany etc. My translations 
from the Czech.
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sident Novotny was an ass’. In fact in 1958 Skutina had been 
co-author of a scenario for a Czechoslovak-Yugoslav film. Novotny 
happened to be starting an ‘anti-revisionist campaign’ when it was 
released and he accused Skutina and co-author of ‘succumbing to 
the cosmopolitan tendencies of the Yugoslav revisionists’. The 
film was banned. Skutina said at several public meetings that 
Novotny shouldn’t pronounce judgement on matters he didn’t under­
stand, whether he was President of the Republic or not. This was 
the real reason for his imprisonment.
After long delays he was eventually tried and sentenced, the state 
producing ‘two witnesses’ who had been in prison themselves at 
the time he was supposed to have ‘lowered the President’s dignity’. 
He served sixteen months. In prison Skutina was interrogated by 
the Procurator General —  the same man who in 1968 tried to 
silence him after he had published his book. He threatened that 
if the writer did not apologise publicly for what he had written, he 
would have him imprisoned for ‘counter-revolutionary activity’. 
Skutina managed to obtain legal protection, the official was dis­
missed. And he writes: ‘And so I was able to prove to my own 
eyes that January had been no mere formality —  thank God even 
for those eight months of the “process of renewal and revival”. 
We had sown the seeds’.
Very revealing is Skutina’s description of prison life under 
Novotny, as late as 1962:
Sometimes I fancied that the organizers of the prison . . . delighted in the 
most cynical absurdities . . .  A former nazi S.S. officer who had been given 
the task of putting out the eyes of Czech children in TerezinS: had the job 
of choosing those prisoners in our section who were allowed to watch TV, 
and he was also responsible for the supervision of prisoners in the TV room. 
For a long time I couldn't get used to eating food prepared by . . . (a man 
who) had murdered his own child . . . cooked it and eaten it.
Skutina writes that hardened criminals were treated much better 
than ‘politicals’ and it was apparently policy to put them together 
to degrade and frighten the politicals. He praises some humane 
guards, condemns those who were brutal.
We can compare Skutina’s inside report on prison life under 
Novotny with a statement by a Mr. B. Chnoupek, now Editor-in- 
Chief of Prague Radio:
The phrases such as 'Prague Spring', ‘new model socialism’ and ‘socialism 
with a hum an face' were attractive but false phrases coined to confuse the 
people.11
h Terezin was a nazi concentration camp. From memory, I believe 15,000 children 
were sent there and only about 100 ever returned.
!• Socialism & Today’s Mass Media, W. J. Brown, Jan. 1970, p.28.
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While Skutina himself writes in the 1969 Afterword to the second 
edition of his book:
And then came January I9<»8. We were all lull oi what was going’ on and 
above all full of hope . . . U r  lived with an unbreakable faith in our 
socialism with the human fate.
And I believe that Skutina’s courage and sincerity have been amply 
proved by his act of republishing his book in 1969 when many of 
the neo-Stalinists he had been attacking publicly already had their 
old jobs back. As he wrote:
f did not stop believing in socialism or the correctness of the course we 
had taken even afterwards when things had slopped being' so simple . . .
As soon as Dubcek came to power in January 1968 and 1 read 
about his Action Programme and evidence came out about it in news­
paper articles, citizens’ private letters, etc., about the new situation 
in the country my reaction was one of great relief and excitement. 
There seemed hope that a Western country like Czechoslovakia 
(which it is culturally and historically) could create a sophisticated 
and healthy, organic society which at long last might solve the 
main problems of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union had 
pointed the way, but on such questions as freedom of speech and 
self-determination had become conservative and inflexible. Although 
'The Soviet Union Our Model' had been a key slogan in Czecho­
slovakia for twenty years, as a leading Czech cultural figure said 
to me in 1964 in Prague, ‘it long ago ceased to be true’. In other 
words, the Soviet Union could rco longer serve as a political, 
cultural, economic or organisational model, except in a very general 
sense —  unless by affronting national dignity and identity and 
by causing dangerous social distortions and stagnation.
Some form of ‘Dubcekism’ was demanded for the revival of the 
stagnating nation and the reform movement was not the product 
of its leaders’ minds primarily but it arose out of the needs of 
the situation. Economic reform was desperately needed. The so- 
called ‘command socialism’ directed almost entirely from one centre 
after the Soviet model had ceased to work. Not only was decen­
tralisation crucial however, but the wider political, cultural and 
social freedoms necessary to allow it to function:
Without the participation of the public, without the initiative of the people 
generally — whatever their relation to Party membership — there would 
be no real progress towards new policies, there would be no renaissance in 
our political life.l"
The effect of the political changes carried through under Dubcek 
can be seen in the example of a North Bohemian firm. In 1963
1° Dubcek s speech to the Special Congress of the Czechoslovak Union of Journal­
ists, held 21-23 June 1968, reported in A'ovinar nos. 7-8, p. 249.
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its deputy director had complained to me about the unqualified 
and corrupt director he served under. The director was not an 
engineer, merely a political puppet who blackmailed employees 
with the help of socret dossiers on their past lives and activities, 
which was routine procedure. After January 1968 this firm’s 
employees simply voted their director out of office and elected a 
specialist who had their confidence. This situation duplicated 
hundreds of times expressed the essential nature of the Dubcek 
regime. And it represented a process of the strengthening of soc­
ialism, not a weakening as some have said. A  slogan in a magazine 
of the period:11 Initiative from Below, Not Planned from Above 
clearly implies the sort of changes that had been needed for a 
return to complete health of Czechoslovak society. Working in a 
Prague factory, I had proved to myself how workers’ thinking was 
done for them on most issues; they were merely asked to approve 
decisions already taken, and that the only effective power in the 
country was wielded by the Central Committee of the C.P., which 
after twenty years of socialism was an insult to the integrity and 
maturity of the Czechpslovak people and a direct cause of ineffi­
ciency, bureaucracy and all sorts of social strains.
‘Dubcekism’ meant a return to creative and principled Marxism. 
The vulgarised Stalinist version in fact often pushed into public 
life those whose grasp of socialist and Marxist principles was weak. 
The best Marxists were destroyed or silenced in the 1950’s. The 
Stalinist rulers evidently believed in the ‘rulers and ruled’ dichotomy 
of capitalism as an unchanging basis of government. But under 
Dubcek the ‘little man’ felt his words, had weight at long last, 
that he was respected and trusted, and the Party and its leaders 
rapidly regained lost popularity and stature. Czechoslovakia has not 
had such a loved and accessible leader since Tomas Masaryk, Father 
of the First Republic. And for people to become active and 
involved in public life after those bleak years, certain freedoms 
were a must:
In the rapid development of political life in Czechoslovakia towards demo­
cracy a decisive role was played by the abolition of censorship . . .12
It is interesting how Dr. Husak commented on the Novotny 
era press to an interviewer regarding the question of the autonomy 
of Slovakia, in the very same magazine:
It's true that for many years public opinion in the Czech lands has been not 
only underinformed, but even directly misinformed.13
11 Reporter, Weekly of Czechoslovak Journalists’ Union, No. 3, 3.7.1968, p. 9. 
l-  Op. cit.
i :t He means the lands of Bohemia and Moravia, as opposed to the territory of 
Slovakia.
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Dr. Husak went on to discuss the problems of nationalism and 
internationalism in the post-1945 period when he and others had 
demanded autonomy:
The efforts to gain national equality were condemned as nationalism.H
And he characterised the feelings of mistrust sometimes occurring 
between Czechs and Slovaks thus:
t hese feelings had been deformed on both sides through the false glorifica­
tion of Internationalism.
Husak of 1968 and Husak of 1970 are practically strangers to 
one another. We can compare this statement with another made 
in May 1970 during Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin’s visit to 
Prague to sign a treaty spelling out the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ which 
allows the Soviet Union the right to interfere in the affairs of 
other socialist countries. Dr. Husak thanked the Russians for 
crushing the ‘reactionary forces that wanted to take Czechoslovakia 
out of the socialist camp’. The treaty gave as its main sanction 
'the common internationalist duty of socialist countries’. Does 
Dr. Husak still hold his original views on nationalism, or is he a 
man with as many faces as the lately-humbled ‘pragmatist’ Harold 
Wilson?
During the past two years not one expression of optimism out 
of Czechoslovakia has come to my notice, unless through the 
mouths of a Husak, a Chnoupek, a Bilak or a W. J. Brown. 
More typical is my Slovak engineer friend who writes from a Czech 
industrial city on July 7, 1969:
Now no one can easily change my opinion that politics is a dirty business 
even under socialism, that it's a struggle for power and for the benefit for 
private interests. Just imagine that all of the Novotny people are once again 
back in their jobs. Only Novotny and SejnalS are lacking. Under present 
circumstances I'm willing to demand Novotny's rehabilitation.
This young man had been known to me as an ardent Soviet 
supporter. He was very bitter about his father being one of only 
three in their Slovak village of several hundred people who approved 
the invasion. He himself resigned from the CP, as did his brother, 
who was so shattered with everything he fled to Canada. His 
letter of 16.9.1966 reveals the depths of his new-found bitterness 
and cynicism:
Only the old mad people are with them. The young people hate them . . . 
For live months they have been trying to prove to us that there was a counter-
t
14 We recall that Husak himself was imprisoned 1950-60 as a 'bourgeois nation­
alist'.
13 Scjna was the General who defected to the West.
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revolution here . . . The majority of people have lost interest in politics 
because they now definitely know it is a dirty and disgusting matter. The 
worst is that we can see no way out. they arc not able to draw an at least 
slightly attractive picture of the future of our two nations. We are great 
pessimists.
This is how the invasion has changed a young Slovak I knew 
as an idealistic and faithful Party member, and we are asked to 
believe by some people that that invasion was a good thing!
So dear to them is their sovereignty, so precious their national 
identity, that to the Czechs August 1968 was 1620 all over again. 
Another Period of Darkness had begun. It may well be that there 
will be no terror, certainly no similar repression of language as by 
the Austrians —  for it will be impossible to reproduce the same 
atmosphere of hysteria, fear and mistrust of the early 1950’s —  but 
foreign troops will remain on Czechoslovak soil indefinitely, the 
state of the economy and living standards decline steadily, and 
gradually also the bouyancy and controversiality is fading from 
creative culture. We heard the Czech Minister of Culture say 
recently: “It is the right of the state to decide what culture should 
reach the public”.1,1
Strong national feeling expressed on a socialist basis was the 
main cultural, political and economic motor of Czechoslovak 
society in the recent period. They wanted to develop socialism in 
their own way in their own country. The invasion switched off. 
this motor and that is the main reason that life is stagnating. 
Young people, most of whom became interested in and involved 
in political life for the very first time under Dubcek, have averted 
their eyes from the faceless and characterless men who are busy 
purging everyone who has been the least bit liberal and independent- 
minded, and who are settling down to an updated version of the 
pre-1968 corrupt, bureaucratic and monolithic style of rule. They 
are the new Jesuits, the new Prophets of anti-Thought, the new 
oppressors, the modern Inquisitors. And now these young people, 
like almost everyone else, have turned inward. They are prepared 
to wait even another 300 years, passing on a torch of hatred, of 
love for a man with a human face, and of fiercely smouldering 
national pride. Meanwhile they live for the present and seek 
comfort in cultural innuendo and Schweik-style political jibes.
But whatever the individual does, history will bide her time. She 
will wait for a new ‘Prague Spring’ and a new Dubcek. And as 
Skutina wrote: ‘We have sown the seeds’.
111 .Wnwweek, <5.4.1970. p.Hi.
30 A U S T R A L IA N  LEFT REV IEW — AUG.-SEPT., 1970
Interview with Ernst Fischer
Spiegel: Mr. Fischer, last year we asked you about the hopes of a 
human socialism, about the danger that in Czechoslovakia the 
experiment of a reconciliation between democracy and communism 
could be ended by violence. You told us: The traces of what 
occurred till now will never disappear. On the next day, foreign 
troops invaded Czechoslovakia.
Fischer: I am still firmly convinced. The traces will not disappear. 
Something extraordinary occurred at that time, which goes well 
beyond everyday politics: for the first time in history a people was 
happy for eight months. Whomever I spoke to in Czechoslovakia —  
whether worker or intellectual —  there was simply the light of 
happiness which rose from the whole people A t last, what we 
thought, at last, what we dreamt!
It was a short intoxication, perhaps like in Russia after the February 
revolution of 1917 until the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly 
and of the supporters of the Soviets in Kronstadt by the Bolsheviks.
I believe that Czechoslovakia, in the few months before August 21, 
was the freest country that ever existed But the memories of 
this happiness cannot disappear. Some will despair, many will 
resign themselves. A  few have become scoundrels. But the mem­
ory of the days of the Prague spring remains a powder keg, with 
which the authorities cannot cope. This powder keg will blow up 
one day.
Ernst Fischcr was horn in 1899. He joined the Communist Party of Austria 
in 1934, and in 1945 became minister lor Education in the Provisional Govern­
ment. He was expelled from the Communist Party after the invasion of Czecho­
slovakia. He is author of The Necessity of Art: a Marxist Approach and other 
books. This interview appeared in Der Spiegel in November 1969. Translation 
by Henry Zimmermann.
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It appears that this powder keg has barely touched other com­
munists, not even the communist parties in the W est
The very mighty offensive of the M oscow power apparatus, and 
of all the power apparatuses loyal and subservient to it, has 
increased. For progressive communists, for those who are demo- 
cratic-revolutionaries, the situation has become more difficult. But 
in the Italian party for example, something similar occurred as in 
Austria. A  group has issued a journal: II Manifesto —  outside 
the party, against the line of the party, against the strategic line 
of the party.
Hie rebels have not yet been expelled from the Party, as you were 
from the CP of Austria?*
At a broad discussion in the Italian Central Committee it was 
stated that sudh things could not be tolerated, but there was no 
sanction, no administrative measure, the result was: “We have to 
continue to discuss”. And at this meeting my friend Lucio Lom- 
bardo-Radice warned: “Beware of the Austrian methods. When 
one starts to expel an Ernst Fischer, and to silence a Franz Marek, 
then the whole party is endangered”. I recount this one event 
to show that there is much explosive material in the parties.
But aren't all the supporters of the Prague model being eliminated 
step by step from the Communist Parties of the West?
We Communists who are not prepared to submit, who are not 
prepared to recognise a sanction, who have our own brains and do 
not think with the brains f»f others —  we have suffered a defeat. 
But it is one of those defeats about which Rosa Luxembourg once 
said that they could be more important for the future than some 
temporary victories. The temporary victors are the tanks, the 
Soviet power apparatus, which has no interest in the existence of 
living communist parties, but only the deepest contempt for them.
The party apparatus then represents anti-Communism?
Nothing is feared more today by the Moscow power apparatus 
than an autonomous revolutionary-democratic movement. This 
started already under Stalin: the great power policy, this great
•  They have been since — trans.
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Russian chauvinism, of which Lenin once said, it was “a scoundrel 
and a despot”. They talk a lot about our break with Moscow. In 
reality it is the other way around. The present Moscow power 
apparatus has broken with the idea of socialism. Brezhnev— that 
is the break with Marx and Lenin.
You are a murxist . . . and the Russians they are not marxists?
We are watching with concern how the terrible heritage of 
Tsarism is gradually stifling the legacy of the October Revolution 
in the Soviet Union. The decisive impulses in the near future 
will not come from the Soviet Union, not from the Eastern bloc, 
but most probably from the West.
From the communist parties of the West?
Perhaps also from individual social democratic parties, also from 
formations which are only just arising and which we cannot yet 
clearly recognise and define. In my party, the Communist Party 
of Austria, the intellectuals, the majority of the shop stewards, 
particularly the younger shop stewards, stand on the side of the 
progressive communists.
The communist parties of the West have to participate in elections. 
Then the official line of the party counts. The course taken against 
the traces of the Prague spring will express itself in the political 
arena in defeat for the communist parties.
The comrades in Sweden have lost an election, here in Austria 
we have lost an election. But that is not decisive. I am not thinking 
of today’s voter. I am thinking of the voter, the people of tomorrow 
and the day after tomorrow. The decisive thing is that a new 
spirit of revolutionary democracy is beginning to break through —  
gradually, in a contradictory way, within the communist parties 
and far beyond the communist parties.
If the communists as a party cannot win an election, which road 
to power do you wish to take if no Soviet tanks can help you?
What interests me is the response to the events in this tiny 
Austrian party in the left Catholic circles, among social democrats,
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among intellectuals and young workers in the factories. For the 
first time, the whole of the youfh organisation does not stand 
behind the party! Here we see what I consider the possibility of 
tomorrow, that is, a community of struggle which is no longer 
a party of the old style, but a new community reaching right across 
all the archaic fronts.
That means: party communism is dead.
Most of the communist parties —  as in general all political 
parties —  have remained far behind developments. The decisive 
contradiction of modern society is, in my opinion, between the 
possibilities and the requirements of our epoch on the one hand 
and a completely archaic social structure on the other hand: archaic 
institutions, archaic parties, archaic thinking —  between the unused 
possibilities which modem science and technology offer us and the 
factual situation in the world. Immense sums are being wasted 
for armaments, the earth is left in a miserable condition, a condition 
of ignorance, of wastefulness, of contradictions —  and one flies to 
the moon. I believe that this contradiction of the waste of pro­
ductive forces, of the squandering, of the misuse of all that modem  
science, technique and labor creates, will increasingly become a 
social force. And this is where I see the decisive contradiction, 
not just in proletariat and bourgeoisie.
The proletariat has until now been seen as the social force which 
alone is interested in solving the contradiction described by you. 
Who will do this now according to your conception?
This contradiction, or rather the possibility of revolt is expressed 
particularly in the youth. The student movement —  which has 
had its successes but also failures —  is a revealing symptom of this 
epoch. This is not simply as before young against old, but this is a 
revolt of the growing generation against the whole archaic environ­
ment, the outlived institutions and courts which surround them.
The communist parties have not been able to establish a genuine 
relationship to the revolution of the youth.
Nor to the second revolutionary force: the alliance of science 
and the labor movement, which is slowly emerging. It is exciting 
to observe how very many of the leading scientists are beginning to
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realise that science is not above moral values but embraces respon­
sibility. And thirdly: tihp working class of today is no longer the 
proletariat of yesterday as Marx knew it. Today it is a class in 
w'hich gradually the border-lines between the skilled worker, the 
technician, the engineer are beginning to become blurred. The 
number of white collar workers is growing. Soon in the highly 
developed countries we shall see more white collar workers than 
blue collar workers.
Will the white collar workers change society then?
Knowledge is outraged more strongly by the social environment 
than lack of knowledge. The highly skilled worker is decisive. 
I believe that intelligence is one of the deciding factors of every 
revolutionary movement, one of the deciding forces of production, 
as fantasy for instance is another productive force.
These theses mean that you are no longer a dogmatic mardst, Mr. 
Fischer. What should the organisation of the revolutionary forces 
be like? D o you believe that some kind of new party will afrise?
We are fed up with the old existing parties. I expect that 
completely different social formations will gradually emerge— full 
Df contradictions, without recipes, at first bespecked with many 
srrors. They can’t be constructed in your head. They arise from 
practice, which must be continually thought through, always be 
tested and transformed into theoretical conclusions.
Can yoki already state some examples or is that at present just a 
hope?
There are already new international contacts between progressive 
people and groups of very different trends.
What kind of people are they?
My friends and I for instance find it mudh easier to talk to a 
progressive young Jesuit or Dominican than with a dogmatic 
communist. Old barriers to an understanding have largely been 
lowered, the old vocabulary is gradually beginning to disappear.
3.r>
Mr. Fischer, are you still a Leninist?
I am a marxist. I believe Lenin was the greatest revolutionary of 
our epoch. But I have the greatest hocror for the term marxist- 
leninist, this theological concept which is in reality only a trans­
literation for Stalinism.
Your hope that the intellectuals might be the decisive revolutionary 
force recalls the old elite theory of Lenin, and* this lies even today 
at the base of the dogma of party communism.
It is not very likely that a social perception and new methods of 
social change will come from any of the existing parties. I can 
imagine it in Italy —  the Communist Party of Italy has really 
basically understood the new contradictions of modern society and 
recognised that new methods are needed; that new perceptions are 
demanded, that new alliances must be forged.
So you are still prepared to gamble on that party?
Also on the Spanish Party and many others.
But what do you expect of the masses?
I see for instance at high schools and universities the growing 
c msciousness of the students, the victims I would say of these 
outdated institutions. These victims say: This can’t go on! For 
different reasons, scientists will say: This can’t go on! And again 
for totally different reasons even larger numbers of workers will 
say: This can’t go on! I mean the growing feeling of malaise, of 
uneasiness, of the feeling that we have affluence, but behind this 
there lies a terrible inner distress, and this distress cries out from 
the schools, and cries out from art, from publications and from 
many manifestos. The growing feeling of distress will increasingly 
penetrate, grow through and finally burst through the feeling of 
affluence. We are living in the midst of the world revolution —  
completely different to the way Marx and Lenin thought of it. 
The only reasonable and necessary goal is socialism.
There are more signs of this disquiet in Western countries than 
for instance in the Soviet Union or the GDR. One could conclude 
from this that the West is closer to the socialism, as you imagine it,
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than the totally stagnant (even in the development of productive 
forces) socialist world, long overshadowed by the West.
The growing disquiet actually proves the opposite.
But only if the conflicts in the socialist countries have been resolved.
The precondition for the Prague spring at any rate was socialised 
industry. A powerful enemy was missing —  capital which is 
interested in the maintenance of its profits. Thus it was easier 
in Czechoslovakia than in a capitalist country to carry out a 
peaceful democratic revolution. In a capitalist country this would 
have been impossible.
What do you mean by “socialised industry”? Who has the power
of decision over the means of production in this “socialised in­
dustry”? Surely not societv —  the working people, the population?
One of the opponents of revolutionary reforms, of a new structure 
of society is the search for profits by the capitalists —  which I am 
not now posing as an individual devilish characteristic, but the 
captialist must be hungry for profits, he really has no alternative; 
either he goes broke or he must continually increase production, 
the rate of profit. This enemy is missing however in a country 
with a socialised industry. In the socialist, let us say in the so-called 
socialist countries, enough enemies remain: the shocking bureaucracy.
But these enemies are much more powerful than private industrialists. 
In a state owned industry, the state is also the employer —  a
master who owns the whole state apparatus directly.
I don’t believe that the state as employer is more dangerous 
than the individual capitalist or the capitalist monopoly.
You can strike against individual capitalists, you can't strike against
the state.
In Czechoslovakia, the nationalisation of enterprises has in no 
way hindered the workers from striking and organising their struggle. 
On the contrary at a certain turning point it made the struggle 
easier. But I am not asserting that the present condition of nation­
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alised industry in the East creates better conditions for the workers 
than the capitalist industry in the West.
Surely even worse, for the workers in the capitalist countries possess 
more political and social rights.
Take the GDR. The conditions of the workers are no worse 
than in the West, in some respects better than in the West. The 
workers have an extensive voice in questions of hiring of employees, 
of the conditions on the job, etc., and are in my experience not at 
all dissatisfied. It is a fact that the GDR is a highly developed 
industrial country. Economically things are improving in the GDR.
But surely that is no argument proving social progress.
No, that’s true. If we understand the competition between 
socialism and capitalism in the way the Soviet leaders for instance 
interpret it: who has a greater social product? where is the 
productivity of labor greater? where is more being produced?— then 
capitalism has won the competition. The competition must be 
fought out as it was attempted to be fought in Czechoslovakia; the 
struggle of human happiness against human unhappiness, the compe­
tition: where is there more freedom? where a greater unfolding 
of all personal abilities? —  the contest between the principle of 
achievement which only thinks in terms of increased production, or 
at least to think that man, not the product, decides. In this 
sphere socialism would potentially be the victor. There are how­
ever no historical examples yet.
So you now develop the force of production, fantasy, which you 
postulated, in the direction of a model which does not yet ex ist
Yes. I am convinced that such a model would have arisen in 
Czechoslovakia —  associated with great difficulties, therefore not 
an ideal example.
Are the traces of this Czechoslovak experiment also visible in 
the communist parties of the socialist countries?
Not in the party apparatuses of the Eastern bloc. But traces of 
these Czechoslovak events have entered deeply into all these 
countries and have released something there. I could name from
Continued on page 43
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ROGER G ARAUDY, born in Marseilles in 1913, is one of the 
most gifted of contemporary Marxist philosophers. Garaudy has 
perhaps done more than any other one man to foster exchange 
and dialogue between the Marxist trend and other significant 
trends in modern thought, such as Christianity, existentialism 
and structuralism.
Already well known in this country for his contribution to 
Christian-Marxist dialogue, he has maintained a constant stream 
of publications on a far wider range of philosophical and political 
questions over the past 30 years. His written works, more than 
20 in number, appear in many languages. Three of his books 
are currently available in English, From Anathema to Dialogue, 
Karl Marx: The Evolution of His Thought and Twentieth Cen­
tury Marxism.
The measure of the breadth of his interests and their connection 
with political activism may be gauged from the fact that his work 
on Arab philosophy was published in Arabic in Cairo by a 
group of supporters of the, then, Colonel Nasser and by the 
revolutionary Ben Bella in Algeria soon after that country had 
won liberation.
Within France his writings as a revolutionary pamphleteer, ex­
pressing the case against French colonialism in Algeria and 
Vietnam, are as well known as his philosophical works.
The most fruitful and' innovatory part of Garaudy’s work has 
come since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in 1956. The terrible revelations of the reality of 
the Stalin era made by Khrushchov at this Congress gave rise 
in Garaudy to an intellectual crisis which led him to rethink all 
the former verities, not as a sceptic, but in order to give them 
a firmer foundation.
Unlike those communists who sought to react to these revelations 
by quickly turning the page, Garaudy plunged into a systematic 
study of the philosophical foundations of revolutionary politics.
His exceptionally rich and varied life led from a Catholic worker’s 
home through a brief period as a protestant convert to the French 
Communist Party at the age of twenty.
He has experienced the reality of the 20th century in the Nazi 
prisons and concentration camps of World War II, in the leader-
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Iii Havana in 1!IG2. Roger Garaudy and Fidel Castro
ship of miners’ strikes, as a Communist Deputy in the French 
Parliament and in his travels which have taken him all over the 
world and given him experience of virtually all regimes of East 
and West.
A  Professor of Philosophy at the University of Poitiers, Roger 
Garaudy has several times been guest lecturer in major univer­
sities in various countries, including the United States, and will 
make a further tour of that country after his visit to Australia.
An activist in the events in May, 1968, in France, this experience 
and the events in Czechoslovakia in the same year led him to 
the writing of his latest controversial book: The Great Turning 
Point of Socialism, in which he discusses frankly his views on 
the main theoretical problems for Marxists today, the problems 
of the plurality of ‘models’ of socialism and socialist strategy.
It is this book, and events that followed, which led to his expul­
sion from the Communist Party of France earlier this year.
In Australia Garaudy will lecture on these as yet unanswered 
questions of socialism and on Christian-Marxist dialogue.
41
Public Lectures
"Socialism's Unanswered Questions—  
Europe 1968"
hniiv fee SI.00 Pensioners students & housewives 50c 
for lectures in Melbourne. Sydney & Brisbane
YIelbourne —  Friday, September 4, 8.00 p.m. Assembly Hall, 
University High School, Story Street, Parkville. 
Adelaide —  Sunday, September 6, 8.00 p.m. Union Hall, 
Adelaide University.
Sydney —  Wednesday, September 9, 8.00 p.m. Paddington 
Town Hall.
Brisbane —  Tuesday, September 15, 8.00 p.m. Relaxation 
Block, Queensland University Union, St. Lucia.
Professor Garaudy will also visit Canberra on September 1 and 
Newcastle on September 17.
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my experience and from the circle of my friends many people of 
different origins and positions who were deeply influenced by 
Prague. They have drawn hope from it that a real socialism is 
possible. They have drawn courage to offer resistance under 
difficult conditions, to organise a kind of illegal activity. True, 
they are only small groups, for instance in Poland.
But these small groups are confronted by big ones, which retire 
into complete apathy.
The immediate reaction is great resignation, despair, cynicism, 
“what’s the use of it all?” Naturally that is the immediate reaction. 
But in the whole historical development small minorities have 
always been decisive in the long run, and anticipated the future.
That's where Lenin appears again.
You could equally say: “That’s where Christ appears again”. 
He started with twelve disciples and then it became a world move­
ment.
But among the twelve there was already a traitor.
Among the twelves who are getting together here and there in 
the countries of the Eastern bloc there is surely a traitor. But 
the one Judas has not prevented Christianity from becoming a 
world movement. And the many Judases, the many scoundrels 
in the countries of the Eastern bloc, will not be able to prevent 
it either in the long run.
Christianity hardly changed the social relations in this world 
but rather stabilised them. Today it appears that communism 
too is unable to change the social relations in this world.
First I would like to defend Christianity. It is true it brought 
forth no social revolutions, but nevertheless it carried some great 
new ideas into a rather brutal egotistical world —  ideas which have 
not become socially dominant, but yet built among a not too small 
section of mankind new moral barriers, an ethical code, which did 
not exist previously. You see, communism, which has had far 
less time so far, and w*hich has had the misfortune to win first
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in a backward country, this communism has nevertheless changed 
some things. It has forced the capitalist world to grant more 
reforms than it would otherwise have done. The beneficiaries of 
the Russian Revolution are not so much the Russians, but rather 
the whole Western working people and the peoples of the “third 
world”.
But communism has also, because of its terrorist appearance in
Russia, robbed socialism of many possibilities in Western Europe.
Since the Prague spring we know that it can be different, such 
a regime can be smashed. A socialism with a human face is 
possible. I repeat, these are the traces which will never disappear 
in the consciousness of millions of people. I do not expect that 
new impulses will come from countries of the East. This is now 
rather the responsibility, the moral and historical duty not only of 
the communists of the West, but of all those in the West who feel 
and think as socialists in the broadest sense of that word. The 
people in the Eastern bloc are waiting for us. I am a very 
unimportant man from a small party in a small country. Yet I 
hope that our voice will be heard.
The Soviet Union today is no longer an under-developed country, 
but an industrial state with the largest proletariat in Europe. Is it 
imaginable that this proletariat —  using the productive force, 
fantasy —  will one day arise and realise a new world?— That
the events of Czechoslovakia will be repeated in the Soviet Union?
It was no accident that this thing started in Czechoslovakia 
because it is the industrially most developed country in the Eastern 
bloc, and also because the Czechs have a great dtemocratic tradition. 
The history and tradition of a people play a decisive role also on 
the road to socialism. This is often underestimated by the vulgar 
marxists. In Russia today beneath the new social relations of 
production, the old tsarist Russia continues to live —  this horrible 
tradition of a country which knew no renaissance, which had no 
city bourgeoisie, but 300 years of Tartar rule instead. We in the 
West have the advantage of a tradition of personal freedom, of 
the awareness of individuality, of the dignity of man and of the 
rights of man, which had been little developed in Russia. This 
whole tradition is becoming virulent and may in the West —  we 
see it today for instance in the churches —  become a revolutionary
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force. On the other hand 1 do not exclude the possibility that in 
the East the idea of socialism, which has degenerated into a phrase, 
may have a definite influence in the education of youth and lead —  
and has led in Czechoslovakia —  to people saying: “Yes, that’s 
what we are taught in school, but in our country things are not 
like that”.
You mean that the phrase forces people to confront reality? It 
still acts as a measuring rod?
I see not only in the communist parties of the West very strong 
potential forces of renewal, but I see these forces also in all the 
countries of the East. But it will be a more difficult, slower, 
contradictory process, for there other opposition forces also exist, 
there is a growing nationalism, movements of religious sects, 
which are becoming increasingly significant, so that it is impossible 
to predict when and how these difficult contradictions, these different 
movements, which oppose the rigidity of the system, will break 
through.
Do you believe a revolutionary upheaval is possible, or do you 
believe that as in the West there is a probability of reform also 
in the East?
In general I would not counterpose reforms and revolution so 
absolutely. I believe that world revolution is a chain of greater 
and lesser reforms which are achieved sometimes by violent means, 
but sometimes also by non-violent means. Soviet technologists 
and people in the economy are forced to ask more and more 
frequently: “Why do we remain behind?” They already feel this 
today. America has overtaken them, they will fall further and 
further behind. The question then arises: perhaps a little more 
democracy is needed after all and perhaps we need newspapers 
which really inform, real discussions to give real incentives for 
productivity, for collective work, for collective thinking, for collect­
ive action. It is also possible that against the Great-Russian 
nationalism there will be an alliance of another many-sided nation­
alism with certain technocratic circles. It is also possible that 
certain sections of the working class will join this, alliance and 
that some time the fall of a dictator, of a politbureau will have 
greater consequences than hitherto. All this is possible. But all 
this I would not like to prophesy in detail.
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As against this vision there is (he small opposition which com­
munists ottered to the Prague intervention, the slight protest against 
the only States in Kurope to cross borders by force of arms since 
the second world war —  the five Warsaw Fact States.
I his has been partially due to the great influence of the respect 
k it  for the Soviet Union as the first communist state of the world, 
the country of Lenin and the October Revolution. I know from 
personal experience how difficult it is to overcome such a deep, 
such a strong feeling of attachment, which we had for the Soviet 
Union. This attachment to the Soviet people, which defeated 
German fascism, I retain as before. But it is not easy to recognise 
and correct deep, great, decisive errors, because this is not just 
an intellectual process, but it is also linked very much with feelings. 
I have complete understanding for old workers, for old communists, 
who are simply unable to learn anew. That was their life, that 
was the content, the meaning of their life.
Surely one could expect from people who claimed to aim to liberate 
the world, to recognise, however painful it might be, that they
have served a criminal cause.
J would never make any reproach to these honest, if dogmatic 
and inflexible, communists. My reproach is directed at the cynical 
apparatus, which tells lies, which is never moved by emotions, 
but only wishes to hold on to its position. I hope that with 
the whole of the younger generation these emotional feelings will 
no longer play any part. It is no accident that the youth stand 
united against this dogmatic line, for to them the Soviet Union 
does not in any way mean what she meant to us —  and I admit 
still means to us in the deeper recesses of our hearts.
But the apparatus had already lied, been cynical and terroristic 
in the past.
That is not correct.
Don’t you have the feeling that for half of your life you have been 
linked with the wrong people?
No, 1 don t have that feeling. You see the great difference 
between the present situation and the time of the trials and purges
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of the thirties is this: We —  I include myself —  really believed that 
it was like that, that there was really a conspiracy against Stalin, 
that the confessions were genuine. We believed that and millions 
believed that.
And today it’s different?
If Brezhnev says anything, nobody believes a word of it and 
those who repeat it consciously lie, and those who listen to it know 
it’s a lie. That is the great difference of the repetition —  the 
first time it is effective, one is prepared and able to co-operate 
faithfully in the most horrible things. The second time it doesn't 
work.
Do vou really believe that this faith existed throughout the 'thirties, 
when everyone in the Soviet Union lived among people, who 
suddenly disappeared the next day, when everyone knew perfectly 
well that they were honest, convinced communists?
1 lived in Moscow at that time. I only had one thought. Hitler 
must be beaten, and only the Soviet Union can beat Hitler. 
Everything else was secondary. If I knew then what I know now, I 
would have conducted the struggle against Hitler in the same 
way or perhaps committed suicide. There was no other alternative.
Even at the time of Stalin’s break with Tito you saw no alternative.
1 shall never forgive myself the position I took then against 
Tito. But I —  like many others —  thought: We are confronting 
a third world war. There can be nothing between the fronts.
But today you stand between the fronts —  or to which camp do 
you belong?
I am no returning prodigal son. I left my father’s house and I 
am moving even further away. I am returning neither to social 
democracy, nor to the world of my father, but I go on as a com­
munist into the unknown.
Mr. Fischer, we thank you for this conversation.
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Peter d'Abbs
Indonesia's Political Prisoners
THERE ARE APPROXIM ATELY 100,000 political prisoners in 
Indonesia today. For those who believe (as at least one Victorian 
academic does) that this total is insignificant when compared to 
the total Indonesian population, the proportional equivalent in 
Australia would be approximately 10,000. Many of the prisoners 
have already been held for several years without trial, and new 
arrests are being made daily.
So far as the military authorities are concerned communism is 
a troublesome spectre. In the months following the “abortive coup” 
of October, 1965, they slaughtered, or presided over the slaughter, 
of between 300,000 and 1.5 million “communists” in an attempt 
to eradicate it.1 While in most places the killing spree seems finally 
to have run its course, there are still occasional reports of mas­
sacres. For example, early last year H. J. C. Princen, Deputy 
Head of the Human Rights Institute, claimed that since November, 
1968, about 1,000 people had been massacred in the Purwodadi 
region of Central Java by two Army divisions. The government 
denied the allegations but refused to implement Princen’s suggestion 
that an independent tribunal be appointed to investigate his claims.2
1 There is still no conclusive evidence as to the exact number killed. The 
numbers given in the text are the lowest and highest estimates I have heard. 
The Economist, Aug. 20, 1966, pp. 727-8, reported that, according to a team of 
150 university graduates from Indonesia, the number killed was likely to have 
been about one million.
2 See M. Bondan (ed.), Indonesian Current Affairs Translation Scrvice (here­
after called ICATS), Djakarta, March, 1969, pp. 140-150, in which reports are 
quoted from Pedoman, A n ghat an Bersendjata, Harian Kami, Indonesia Raya, 
Sinar Harapan. Nusantara, Kompas and other newspapers.
Peter D'Abbs is a post graduate student in political science at Melbourne Univer­
sity.
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The armed forces newspaper claimed that the allegations were 
nothing more than fabrications by an international political guer­
rilla movement, to which most of the notable Western social 
scientists concerned with Indonesia were alleged to belong (e.g. 
one of them, Dr. Benedict Anderson, “is a blood brother of Perry 
Anderson, editor of the New Left Review”) Generally, however, 
the mass slaughter seems to have been replaced by a means of 
suppression more in keeping with the rest of the 20th century: 
political detention camps.
Indonesian statistics are not noted for reliability, and the political 
sensitivity of this issue makes a clear picture even harder to obtain. 
Nevertheless, the evidence given, even by the government’s own 
spokesmen, is considerable. For example, in March, 1969, Major- 
General H. Achmat Tahir, Special Deputy of the Indonesian 
Department of Defence and Security, stated that there were then 
about 80,000 political detainees in Indonesia.4 The Head of Public 
Relations of the Prosecutor-General’s office, M. Simatupang, stated 
in February, 1969, that the total number of political prisoners was 
about 100,000 .5 In October last year General Panggabean, then 
Deputy Commander of the Command to Restore Security and Order, 
stated that the number of those whose cases had not yet been 
settled —  i.e., who had not been brought to trial —  was 71,905  
persons.6 Finally, in April last year, an intelligence officer of the 
Department of Defence and Security said that there were more 
than 150,000 political prisoners in Java alone.7
Details on the location and number of detention camps are, as 
one might expect, not so readily available. In the populous area 
of Central Java, where a “state of war” was officially in force until 
January this year,* the Minister for Information, Budiardjo, has 
admitted that there are 16 internment camps with about 400  
persons in each.9 In an interview last year the Chief-of-Staff of the 
Sumatra Co-ordinating Command, Major-General Muskita, was 
asked the number of political detainees in Sumatra; he refused 
to give a figure, but when the number “20 ,000” was mentioned he 
replied: “There are that many”.10 (It is not uncommon, incidentally.
3 Angkatan Bersendjata, 17/3/69, p. 1. (ICATS, March 1969, p. 150.)
4 /CATS, March 1969, p. 134.
B Nusantara, 21/2/69, p. 1. (ICATS, Feb. 1969, p. 82.)
« Suluh Marhaen, 31/10/69, p. 1. (ICATS, Oct. 1969, p. 636.)
~Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Jan.-June 1969, Sydney University, 
p. 100. T he statement originally appeared in the Djakarta Times, 19/4/69.
8 ICATS, Jan. 1970, p. 1.
Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, op. cit., p. 102.
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for regional statistics to contradict those given by the central 
government.)
Classification of prisoners
Political detainees are divided into three categories. Those who 
are officially alleged to have had some knowledge of the “abortive 
coup” plans are classified as Group A. When Tahir gave the total 
number of detainees as 80,000 he stated that 4,452 of them were 
Group A .11 The government has stated that it intends to bring 
all Group A  prisoners to trial.
Another 14,458 prisoners (again, using Tahir’s breakdown) are 
classified as Group B:1- that is, the government admits that it has 
no direct evidence that they were involved in the coup attempt, so 
it intends to imprison them indefinitely without trial.
Early last year the government began looking for a suitable 
island on which it could confine Group B prisoners, and after a 
few months the island of Buru, in the Moluccas, was chosen.13 In 
August last year 2,500 prisoners were taken there, among them 
one of Indonesia’s foremost writers —  Pramudya Ananta Tur. 
In the first quarter of 1970 it was planned to send a further 5,000  
prisoners there, as well as an unspecified number of detainees from 
Gerwani —  the former Communist Women’s Organization.14
Although Buru was originally given the euphemistic label of 
“resettlement project”, and the prisoners theoretically allotted land 
of their own, in practice they are still detained under constant 
guard in barbed-wire-protected compounds, and while conditions 
probably are a little better than in the camps in Java, even the 
influential daily Harian Kami stated that it was pointless pretending 
that the Buru camps were anything other than concentration camps. 
(Harian Kami went on to add that the government had no alternative 
but to send detainees there, since it could no longer afford the cost 
of keeping them in Java, nor could it run the risk of releasing 
them.)15
A  further 24,059 prisoners are classified at Group C: they are 
not accused of complicity in the coup attempt, but simply of having 
been associated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). 
Official government policy is to release all Group C prisoners, and
•0 Angkatan Hersendjata, 7/11/69. p. 1. (ICATS. Nov. I960, p. 70V) 
n  ICATS, March 1969. p. 134.
Ibid.. p. 134.
13 Kompas, 13/2/69. p. I. (ICATS, Feb. 1969, p. 82.)
14 Berila Yudha, 16/1/70, p. 2. (ICATS, Jan. 1970, p. 57.)
IB Harian Kami, 23/12/69, p. 1. (ICATS, Doc. 1969, p. 772-3.)
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some have already been set free. Their freedom, however, is far 
from unconditional. Every released Group C prisoner is given a 
guide book containing an oath of loyalty which he must take 
with him wherever he goes. He is not allowed to change his 
address for at least six months, and he must report regularly to the 
authorities.1” Any infringement of these conditions results in his 
being imprisoned again —  as a Group A or B prisoner. A  recent 
visitor to one village in Java reports that former Group C prisoners, 
of whom there are many in the village, are chronically unemployed 
because anybody who gives them work —  or any sort of assistance 
—  is automatically regarded as politically suspect by the all-powerful 
local army commander.
Finally, of the 80,000 detainees mentioned by Tahir, the biggest 
group, comprising about 33,000 persons, had not yet been classi­
fied17: that is, they had not even been formally accused, let alone 
tried. (Other accounts show this group as containing even more 
detainees.)
Conditions & effects
Since most Indonesians are desperately poor, it would be ludicrous 
to expect to find good conditions in the country’s prisons. Yet the 
evidence available suggests that conditions in the political prisons 
are unnecessarily barbaric. One account states that the amount 
allocated for feeding political detainees works out at 7.7 rupiahs 
per detainee per day —  enough for one cupful of rice.1* Allegations 
of torture have also been made: for example, H. J. C. Princen 
claimed last year that the army leaders behind the mass-murders 
in Purwodadi used torture by electricity to obtain confessions.19
But it is not only the detainees themselves who are suffering. 
Thousands of families —  many of them poor to start with —  have 
been deprived of breadwinners. Hundreds of women have 
been forced into prostitution; in one town in Eastern Indonesia, 
according to an informant from that town, army officers are 
systematically forcing wives of detainees into prostitution under 
threat of further harm to the detainees themselves. Often the wives 
of prisoners never learn why their husbands have been arrested, 
under what classification they have been grouped, or even where 
they are being detained. Moreover, in many cases the relatives of 
detainees are automatically regarded as being politically suspect.
1* Suluh Marliaen, 16/1/70, p. 2. (ICATS, Jan. 1970, p. 55.) 
i t  1C ATS, March 1969, p. 134.
l8B arbro Karabu.'la, Letter from Indonesia, Eastern Horizon, 7(5). 1969, p. 43.
WPedoman. 1/3/69. p. 2. (ICATS, March 1969. p. 140-1.)
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There are other, bizarre manifestations of the processes at work. 
An owner of a Djarkarta art-curio shop specialising in Balinese 
carvings almost went out of business because most of the artists 
who supplied him were either killed or imprisoned. The shortage 
of teachers in Java has become more acute as a result of the 
disproportionate number of teachers detained there. Many masters 
of Java’s oldest and most famout art form, the puppet theatre or 
"wajang”, have been imprisoned, and those still performing are 
carefully censored. Use of the PKI “complicity smear” has become 
notorious. Once somebody is accused of being a communist he has 
no recourse to anything. —  unless he happens to be friendly with 
a higher officer. There have been numerous cases of people 
successfully avoiding having to repay their debts by accusing their 
creditors of being “PKI”.
It is impossible at this stage to predict the political consequences 
of the present policy of political suppression. In any case, this 
issue cannot be separated from others which affect the mass of 
people, such as the bloodbath following the “abortive coup” and 
the pro-Western economic policy of the Soeharto government. 
One thing appears to be certain, since it is noted as often by 
supporters as by critics of the government: there is today wide­
spread dissatisfaction in many rural areas —  dissatisfaction arising 
out of the suffering and social dislocation which followed the fall of 
Soekarno, with an apparent decline in educational opportunities, 
with (in some parts of Java) economic schemes that benefit mainly 
rich overseas corporations, and with the failure of the Soeharto 
government to even begin putting an end to the corruption which 
attained such spectacular proportions under Soekarno. But the 
dissatisfaction is inchoate; it is shared by politically powerless, 
leaderless, dispersed and relatively uneducated people, who are 
likely to remain that way for some time to come, since the govern­
ment response to any clear expression of dissatisfaction would 
almost certainly be an intensification of suppression.
I believe only one prediction is in order: however successful the 
present economists and technocrats may be in curbing inflation and 
restoring “order” to the economy, and however firmly the army’s 
firepower may enable it to rule (so long as it remains united), 
the suffering generated by the killings and the detention policy —  
and this is not being quietly forgotten —  together with the continuing 
hardship of life in the villages at a time when more and more 
people throughout the Third World are refusing to accept their 
poverty as just, suggest that the seeds today are being sown for 
massive future conflict. To try and predict the form and conse­
quences of this conflict would, in my opinion, be foolhardy.
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Rex Mortimer
Marxism and Asia
IT IS THE LEAST of this book’s merits that it brings together a 
broader and more intelligently conceived range of texts treating 
the interaction between Marxism and revolution in Asia than has 
ever before been assembled within one volume. Beginning with 
Marx’s scattered writings on India, China and the characteristics 
of the peasantry, it traces with well-judged selectivity the evolution 
of Marxist thinking about revolution in the East through debates 
inside the Second International, the works of Lenin, resolutions 
of the Communist International, right down to contemporary Soviet 
views on national democracy. In the period after 1917 these 
documents are balanced by others taken from the contributions to 
Marxism by Chinese Marxists and communists, and particularly, 
of course, Mao Tse-tung.
The result is a fascinating and complex chronicle, in which we 
can follow at first hand the genesis and development of many of 
the disputes and conflicts which have bedevilled and agitated 
Marxists right down to the present day (incidentally reminding us 
that, in the realm of ideology, at any rate, there is nothing new 
under the sun). Many of the texts are well-known and have attained 
the status of hallowed authorities; others again are obscure, but 
significant passages from such forgotten figures as the Tatar com­
munist Sultan Galiev or Mao’s early teacher and friend, Li Ta-chao.
* Marxism and Asia, An Introduction with Readings. By Stuart R. Scram and 
Helene d'Encausse. Allen Lane The Penguin Press, -104 pp., $10.50.
Rex Mortimer is a lecturer in the Department of Government at Sydney Uni­
versity.
There are so many issues raised in this material that those who 
delight in unravelling the maze of tactical, organisational and 
strategic questions which occupy so much of the time of revolutionary 
socialists will find endless food for speculation and controversy. 
The great contribution of the authors, however, is to provide a 
long introductory essay which separates the wood from the trees 
and brilliantly uncovers the basic processes at work beneath the 
perennial argumentation of the ideologues. The central theme of 
this challenging overview is of such importance and contemporary 
relevance as to demand brief outline and discussion.
D'Encausse and Schram regard the development and trans­
formation of Marxism as indissolubly bound up with the ‘dis- 
Europeanisation’ of the world, which is one of the fundamental 
features of our time. Marx was, as they emphasise, a thorough­
going Europeanist culturally, notwithstanding his immense world 
vision, and his concept of world revolution was set within the 
context of the spread of the dynamic qualities of modern European 
civilisation, whose attainments he celebrated as he pilloried the 
social relationships which fettered its further progress. Socialism 
to him represented the crowning culmination of Western develop­
ment; its pre-condition was capitalist industrialisation, which for 
the first time in history created the prospect of abundance and 
hence the possibility of transcending the class exploitation, the 
stunting division of labour and the alienation which scarcity 
economics made inescapable. Industrialisation also furnished the 
gravediggers of capitalism, those who had nothing to lose but 
their chains, the workers who in the act of freeing themselves would 
lay the foundations for universal freedom.
In his sparse writings on the underdeveloped world Marx mani­
fested his belief in the transforming role of productive technique, 
the decisive revolutionary mission of the European proletariat and 
the static character of the “Oriental mode of production” in Asia. 
While his later work showed a tendency to recognise some potential 
for socialism in “archaic” systems and classes (as, for example, 
in his discussion of the Russian commune, and his remarks on the 
peasants generally), he remained convinced that only revolutionary 
changes in Europe and North America could precipitate socialist 
transformations on a world scale.
It is no secret any longer that it was Lenin who mediated the 
adaptation of Marxism to Asia. The very nature of Russia, situated 
geographically and culturally midway between Europe and Asia, 
contributed in no small measure to the determination of Lenin’s 
ideas. Ho compensated for the weakness of the proletariat by 
elevating the role of party organisation and the professional revo­
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lutionary, and proposing a class alliance with the peasantry, and 
so fashioned an instrument for revolution in underdeveloped coun­
tries. He also recognised, as Marx had not, the importance of the 
national question in revolutionary strategy. His analysis of imperial­
ism, which gave rise to the theory of the “weakest link in the 
chain”, and his adoption of Trotsky’s thesis of uninterrupted revo­
lution (by which the capitalist stage could be bypassed) provided 
the justification for jettisoning the deterministic aspects of Marxism 
and enabling communists in underdeveloped countries to seize 
power in the name of the proletariat and socialism.
It was small wonder that it was to Lenin rather than Marx that 
Asian radical intellectuals looked for answers to the problems that 
agitated them in the age of national awakening in the East. His 
works were read wherever revolutionary nationalists discussed the 
nature of imperialist oppression, the struggle for emancipation, the 
formation of national states, the ways of overcoming the legacies 
of economic backwardness and cultural submission.
But Lenin himself remained sufficient of a Europeanist to believe 
that revolution in the advanced West would be needed to make a 
socialist revolution in Russia viable, and to discount the possibility 
of revolutions in Asia succeeding without the help of the European 
proletariat. But the impatience for change which had led him to 
hurdle the obstacles to immediate revolution in Russia soon affected 
Asian revolutionaries also. The first manifestation of this in the 
communist movement was the dispute between Lenin and the Indian 
communist M. N. Roy at the second congress of the Communist 
International. Where Lenin was cautious about revolutionary pros­
pects in the East, and advised the communists there to accept the 
hegemony of the national bourgeoisie in the colonial emancipation 
struggle, Roy’s burning nationalism expressed itself in giving Asia 
a central place in the world revolution and conceiving the ability 
of the oppressed colonial proletariat to lead the national liberation 
movement directly to socialism. The dispute between Lenin and 
Roy, and the later interventions of Sultan Galiev, prefigured, in 
spirit if not in letter, the later conflicts that were to develop between 
the Soviet and Asian communist movements.
Mao Tse-tung took up where Lenin and Roy left off. His wedding 
of nationalism and Marxism inspired by Li Ta-chao, Mao by 1925 
(in his report on the peasant movement in Hunan province) had 
already arrived at the conviction which was to dominate his life’s 
work, that the poor peasantry of China constituted an irresistible 
and inexhaustible tide of revolutionary spirit which could be har­
nessed to the transformation of his country. In the aftermath of 
the debacle of the Comintern’s policy of uniting with the “national
bourgeoisie" in the Kuomintang, Mao proceeded to put his beliel' 
to the test, with results that are now history. In the process he 
further transformed Marxism by eliminating the revolutionary role 
of the industrial proletariat (except in ritualistic terms) and 
obliterating the relationship between socialism and advanced tech­
nology.
D'Encausse and Schram rightly see in this evolution more 
than the revision of a doctrine to fit revolutionary exigencies. It 
represented an historic meeting between Marxism and the national 
reassertion of Asians, which profoundly affected both. In China, 
with its millenia of distinctive development and its rich culture and 
political traditions, the problem affecting all colonial peoples, that 
of “modernising while remaining themselves,” was felt most acutely 
and could not be resolved by accepting a tutelary status to Euro­
peans and European thought. Marxism had to be Sinified, and 
China had to assert the relevance of her revoiutionary model for 
the rest o f Asia.
The more the Soviet Union under Stalin and his successors came 
to identify the interests of world revolution with the interests of 
the USSR as a state (a tendency which, as the authors point out, 
had already begun under Lenin), the more the seeds of the great 
schisms of our time were sown. Many elements enter into the Sino- 
Soviet conflict, but underlying it and intensifying its manifestations 
is the antagonism between Soviet paternalism and Asian national 
pride. Russian disregard for the interests of Asian communists is 
nowhere more clearly revealed than in the contemporary theory of 
“national democracy” which, stripped of its ideological trimmings, 
assesses the social character of third world regimes solely by refer­
ence to their susceptibility to Soviet influence. In recent times, as 
this book documents, Soviet theorists have even come to view the 
military in these countries as “objectively” a force for transforma­
tion in the direction of socialism. That this has not remained merely 
a theoretical exercise is illustrated by the case of Indonesia, where 
in 1964-65 Soviet representatives shifted their support away from 
the pro-Chinese Indonesian Communist Party and undertook negotia­
tions with anti-communist military leaders through representatives 
of the small but influential Murba Party.
In their contest with the Soviet the Chinese have elaborated their 
own strategic world view. Ironically, they have taken up a Comin­
tern formulation referring to the underdeveloped countries as “the 
villages of the world”, and converted it from a term of disparagement 
to one of pride. To the Chinese, the Western countries constitute 
a “burnt-out revolutionary hearth”, and the revolutionary future 
lies with the third world. Implicitly, they believe that contradictions
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between classes are less fundamental than contradictions between 
the developed and underdeveloped regions. In this, they arrive at 
conclusions similar to those of some W estern scholars, who see a 
developing “convergence" between industrial countries irrespective 
of political coloration.
While the Chinese are undoubtedly more influenced by ideological 
factors than are the Russians, there is also a greater element of state 
interest in the basic Chinese concept than is often realised. For a 
country which aspires to challenge the great powers, but is deficient 
in conventional power resources, it makes sense to encourage libera­
tion struggles in their hinterlands as a means of weakening them, 
tying down their forces, and ultimately extracting concessions from 
them.
In the course of its Eastern migration, as we have seen, virtually 
the whole of M arx's scheme of social revolution was discarded in 
favour of an ever more pronounced voluntarism. Lenin initiated 
the trend towards elevating politics above economics; M ao carried 
the process still further; and it reaches its final (?) culm ination in 
the theories of Regis Debray and some Cuban leaders, who com ­
pletely eliminate the masses, class factors and the economic base 
from consideration and conceive revolution in term s of the willed 
actions of small groups of conscious elites.
The issue between determinism and voluntarism is usually argued 
in philosophical or ideological terms. But it seems obvious from the 
history of the past fifty years that the attem pt to draw a “correct" ’ 
line between the two in revolutionary strategy is fundamentally 
misconceived. The vulnerability of political systems to revolutionary 
action varies according to a number of factors, one of which is 
the depth of social penetration (political, ideological, control) which 
the system in question achieves. If this penetration is shallow, then 
a system which appears relatively stable on the surface may be over­
thrown by a small cadre force of revolutionaries (as was the case 
in Cuba). Where, on the contrary, the political power drives deep 
into society, it may withstand quite deepgoing economic and social 
crises without succumbing to much larger revolutionary movements, 
as the history of W estern Europe confirms. An accent on voluntarism 
or determinism in the revolutionary movement may in large measure 
reflect these circumstances, so that the line between “adventurism ' 
and “economism” will be drawn at different points under different 
environmental conditions.
In a sense, the revenge M arx has taken upon his voluntarist 
revisers has been to deny them the possibility, once they have 
jumped over his historical stages, of creating anything more than
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a caricaturc of his original socialist vision. This is no more than 
another way of saying that Marxism in the underdeveloped world 
has been transform ed from a theory of post-capitalist society into 
a vehicle for industrialisation and m odernisation more acceptable 
in some contexts than the capitalist alternative.
W hile eastern Marxism developed a new voluntarist dynamic, 
orthodox M arxism in the W est stagnated and degenerated. This 
leads d’Encausse and Schrani to pose their concluding paradox: 
“W hen one considers both the various theories which call them ­
selves M arxist, and the realities of the world today, it would seem 
that the only alternative lies in a choice between a scholastic 
M arxism which has nothing to do with revolution and a revolution 
that has nothing to do with M arxism .” It is true, as they point 
out, that the traffic between M arxism and Asia no longer flows 
along a one-way street, and the radical student movement in par­
ticular has adopted many of the voluntaristic aspects of Asian 
M arxism. But, while the new radicals have punctured the sterile 
determinism of the older leftwing political structures, they appear 
now to be running into a cul-de-sac of their own. Meanwhile, 
classical W estern M arxism is being revitalised in the W est and 
applied to the still embryonic trends in post-industrial society. 
O ut of the new technological revolution and the parallel analysis 
of it in M arxist terms may come a fresh dynamism, fusing the 
determ inistic and voluntarist strains in M arx in ways more appro­
priate to this setting than either of the alternatives suggested by 
these authors.
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John Playford
The Permissive Politicians
COMPARING THE PROBITY of members of the political execu­
tive in Australia and Britain, Professor Sol Encel has remarked of 
the Australian experience:
The long list of ministers who have been charged with corruption, and the 
repeated refusal of governments to lay down rules about the private 
interests of their members, reflect a basic difference of outlook about the 
standards appropriate to public life . .  . i
However, before discussing the Australian experience in detail it 
is necessary to examine briefly the norms of behavior adhered to 
in Britain.
I
In an attempt to remove or at least minimise the possibility of 
a clash between the public duties and private interests of Ministers 
of the Crown, the Britislh Parliament has over the years evolved a 
comprehensive ruling on their business interests. Back in 1906 
the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, ruled that all 
directorships held by Ministers must be resigned, except for 
directorships of philanthropic undertakings and directorships in 
private companies. This ruling remained definitive for over three 
decades, although there was increasing dissatisfaction with his 
narrow definition of private companies since under changing com-
l  S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia (Melbourne University Press, 
1962), p. 15.
John Playford is lecturer in political science at Monash University.
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pany arrangements a private company was frequently a very large 
company. Furthermore, there had been a large extension of private 
companies acting as holding companies for public companies.
The whole question of private and public companies came to a 
head in 1939 with the revelation that Lord Runciman, the Lord 
President of the Council, was the director of a number of large 
private companies. lh e  Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, 
recognised that if Campbell-Bannerman's ruling were to be inter­
preted in the modern statutory sense it would go far beyond the 
intentions of its framer. Accordingly, he ruled tih,at the term 
"private companies” was to apply only to concerns dealing wholly 
or mainly with family affairs or interests, and which were not 
primarily concerned in trading.
While Campbell-Bannerman had delivered a reasonably compre­
hensive ruling on the question of directorships held by Ministers, 
the situation with regard to shareholdings, speculative investments 
and interests in Government contracts, remained in doubt. During 
the Marconi Inquiry debate of June 1913, Prime Minister Asquith 
laid down a rule of conduct for the guidance of Ministers in financial 
matters. He remarked on the "perfect absurdity” of the doctrine 
that a Minister ought not to hold shares in any company with which 
the Government has or may have a contract. There was only one 
rule to be observed, he continued, and that was thjat any interest 
held by a Minister in a Government contract coming before him 
must be disclosed to his parliamentary head, and the Minister 
himself should stand aside while the transaction was going through. 
Moreover, Asquith declared that there were certain commonsense 
principles, which he classified as “rules of positive obligation”. 
Ministers should not enter into transactions where private interests 
may conflict with public duty; they must not use official information 
for private profit; they should not use their influence in support 
of a contract in which they have an undisclosed private interest; 
they must not accept favors from persons contracting or seeking 
contracts with the state; and they must avoid speculative invest­
ments in which their position gave them an advantage over other 
investors. Beyond these "rules of obligation” there were “rules of 
prudence ’ which he found difficult to formulate in precise terms. 
However, one of the obvious “rules of prudence” would be that 
Ministers should avoid all transactions which might lead to a 
belief that they were doing anything forbidden by the “rules of 
obligation”.
The last important ruling on the private interests of Ministers 
was laid down by Sir Winston Churchill in 1952. It is largely a 
compound of previous rulings. Ministers are urged so to order
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their affairs that no conflict arises or appears to arise between their 
private interests and their public duties. They must not engage 
in any activities which may distract their attention from their public 
duties, and they must, in cases of the retention of private interests, 
declare those interests if affccted by public business, while detaching 
themselves from the consideration of that business. Ministers must 
resign all directorships, public or private, paid or unpaid, with the 
exception of private companies established for the maintenance of 
private family estates, or directorships and offices held in connection 
with philanthropic undertakings. And even these directorships 
should be resigned if any risk of conflict with public duties ever 
arises. Ministers must divest themselves of a controlling interest 
in any company, and of shares, whether controlling or not, in 
concerns closely connected with a Minister's own Department. Fin­
ally, they should scrupulously avoid speculative investments in 
securities about which they have, or may be thought to have, early 
or confidential information. Churchill’s ruling has been upheld 
by subsequent Conservative and Labor Governments, one example 
being Basil de Ferranti’s resignation in 1962 from the position of a 
Junior Minister in the Macmillan Government.-
II
By contrast, we find in Australia the prevalence of easy-going 
standards regarding the possibility of conflict between a Minister’s 
official position and his private interests.3 In the 1880s successive 
Governments in Queensland were so closely linked with the Queens­
land National Bank, the principal financial institution of the Colony, 
that Opposition critics described the Morehead Ministry (1888-90) 
as a branch of the bank. The Premier himself was a director; 
the Treasurer, Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, was a former director and 
one of the largest shareholders; A. H. Palmer, President of the 
Legislative Council and a former Premier, was also a director. 
Mcllwraith’s successor as Treasurer, W. Pattison, was the largest 
shareholder in the bank as well as chairman of the Mount Morgan
2 The best discussion of the attempts to overcome the problem in Britain is 
D. C. M. Platt. "T he Commercial and Industrial Interests of Ministers of the 
Crown", Political Studies, Vol. IX. No. 3, 1961, pp. 267-290. See also Ivor 
Jennings. Cabinet Government (Cambridge University Press. 3rd ed.. 1959), pp. 
106-110; Arthur Bcrricdale Keith, th e  liritisli Cabinet System, 18)0-1938 
(London: Stevens and Sons, 1939). pp. 186-188; Simon Haxey, lory  M.P. 
(London: (.ollancz), 1939. pp. 32-10.
Ministers in New Zealand observe basic principles similar to those upheld by 
their British counterparts. See M. N. Dollimorc, "The Pecuniary Interests of 
Ministers and Members: Principles Applied in New Zealand". The Parliamen­
tarian, October 1969, pp. 334-336.
;i For a survev of the situation up to (he late 1950s. see F.ncel. op. cil., pp. 
293-299.
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Mining Co., one of the largest industrial concerns linked with the 
bank.1 In 1904, George Swinburne, Victorian Minister of Water 
Supply, was attacked in the Victorian Parliament because he was 
a director of the large engineering firm of Johns and Waygood, 
which tendered for Government contracts. Swinburne resigned 
from the board in 1905, although he rejoined wjien he went out of 
office.5 In 1924 a Federal Minister resigned from the Hughes- 
Page Ministry after he was indirectly implicated in the operations 
of Canberra Freeholds Ltd., whose London office in Australia 
House was selling blocks of land in Canberra under false pretences.0
One of the most notable cases was that of Senator A. J. McLach- 
lan, Federal Postmaster-General in 1934-38. M. Blackburn, Labor 
MHR, asked Prime Minister Lyons whether any Ministers were 
company directors. His question was prompted by tSie fact that 
McLachlan was a director of several important companies, including 
the Hume Pipe Co. Australia Ltd., the largest manufacturer of 
concrete pipes in Australia, which did considerable business with 
the Post Office. Lyons replied that “No reason can be seen why 
information of this personal character should be supplied to the 
honourable member”. Subsequently, pointed questions were raised 
in Parliament about the letting oi' Post Office tenders to the Hume 
Pipe Co., of which McLachlan was chairman of directors. Reluct­
antly, Lyons was pushed into making a statement of principle regard­
ing directorships held by Ministers in public companies:
It docs not seem to me to be practicable or desirable to lay down a general 
rule that no Cabinet Minister shall be a director of any company. It would 
be plainly anomalous if one Minister could retain the whole of the 
proprietorship of some business or enterprise, while another Minister was 
debarred from being one of several directors conducting an exactly similar 
business or enterprise . . .  If a contract which the Government makes with 
such a company is one which results from the exercise of individual judgment 
or selection, as in the case of the supply of goods of some special kind, it 
seems clear that a directorship of the company concerned would be incon­
sistent with the discharge of ministerial duty. But some arrangements 
which are technically contracts are made on a non-selective or non­
discriminating basis . . .  if there is the slightest element of judgment or 
choice involved in the placing of government business, no Minister should 
be a director of a company which is the recipient of that business.
Not surprisingly, McLachlan tendered his resignation as Postmaster- 
General.7
• Ibid., p. 293.
5 E. H. Sugden and F. W. Eggleston, George Swinburne: A Biography (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1931), pp. 163-164, 409.
6 Frank C. Green, Servant of the House (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1969), p. 48. 
1 Encel, op. cit., pp. 296-297; A. J. McLachlan, An F.A.Q. Australian (Melbourne: 
Lothian, 1948), pp. 254-259; Peter Heydon, Quiet Decision: A Study of George
Foster Pearce (Melbourne University Press, 1965), p. 114.
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The most notorious case of all was that of Sir Arthur Warner, 
a Victorian State Minister and a leading industrialist, who was the 
central figure in a long succession of incidents where he had clearly 
used his political position to advance his business interests. While 
Minister for Housing, Materials and State Development in 1947-50, 
he had retained directorships in many companies having dealings 
with his various Departments. These flagrant abuses of the norms 
of behaviour to be found in Britain led to a full-scale debate in 
the Victorian Legislative Assembly during September 1949, but 
Warner’s record was passionately defended by Premier Hollway. 
For six months before the 1950 State election he was also Minister 
of Electrical Undertakings and, at the same time, head of Victoria’s 
greatest electrical manufacturing business.
As Minister for Transport 1955-62, Warner was involved in 
even more notorious examples of a clear conflict o f interests 
between his public duty and his private interests. Electronic Indus­
tries Ltd., of which he was managing director, supplied electrical 
equipment to the Railways Department, of wfhjich he was Ministerial 
head. The disclosure that automatic soft-drink machines manu­
factured by one of his companies were being installed in Victorian 
railway stations, and that the old water fountains were being 
removed, led to yet another debate in the Legislative Assembly 
on November 19, 1958. Premier Bolte typically refused to take 
the Labor Opposition’s charges seriously. He claimed that Warner 
was not a director of Vending Machines Pty. Ltd. However, when 
a Labor member pointed out that Warner was managing director 
of the company owning Vending Machines, Bolte merely replied 
that “Dr. Evatt is your managing director”.8
By this time it was obvious that literally anything could take 
place in the permissive atmosphere of Victorian State politics. In 
October 1967 the Chief Secretary and Deputy Premier, Sir Arthur 
Rylah, was appointed to the board of the clothing and footwear firm 
of Easywear Ltd. A  stormy debate on the subject ensued in 
the Legislative Assembly on October 25, 1967. However, with 
the firm backing of the Attorney-General, Rylah emerged unscathed. 
In June 1968 he accepted his second directorship. The firm 
involved, Avis Rent-a-Car Systems Pty. Ltd., engaged in tenders 
for State and Federal Government contracts. While Acting Pre­
mier, Rylah visited New Zealand in August 1968 to negotiate with
8 Encel, op. cit., pp. 297-298; Nation, 22 November 1958, 11 April 1959; 
Katherine West, Power in the Liberal Party (Melbourne: Cheshire. 1965), pp. 
19, 40-44.
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NZ Ministers, unsuccessfully as it turned out, a licence for Avis 
in New Zealand. The Victorian State Opposition Leader, Clyde 
Holding, demanded an immediate session of Parliament to debate 
the issue, but Bolte arrogantly refused the request, terming the 
episode a "trivial matter When Parliament eventually resumed, 
a full-scale debate on the issue took place on September 17, but 
again the Liberal Ministry confirmed the status quo. Towards the 
end of January 1969, Rylah announced publicly —  and with intense 
bitterness —  that he had resigned his Avis directorship back in 
October 1968. Yet he also disclosed tlhat he would be continuing 
his association with the company.10 Early in 1970 Rylah resigned 
his Easywear directorship after the company was taken over by 
another firm.
It is interesting to note that Bolte, in defending the Victorian 
practice, has claimed that Ministers holding company directorships 
are on exactly the same plane as lawyers, farmers and accountants, 
etc. Other Liberal politicians have attempted to score juvenile 
debating points by pointing to Clyd; Holding's -jhare in a 
Melbourne legal firm. But as Platt has noted: “A clear distinction 
must necessarily be observed between the problems of a rule of 
behavior applicable to legislators as a whole and a rule applied 
solely to members of the Government."11 Defenders of the Victorian 
system have failed to understand the meaning of the dictum that 
“The wife of Caesar must be above suspicion". Opposition spokes­
men have been careful not to accuse Rylah of corruption; rather 
they demonstrated that he had placed himself in a position where 
h<is Ministerial activities could be interpreted as subordinate to his 
business interests.
In the same period, three of Rylah’s fellow Victorian Ministers 
have also been company directors. While on the board of Toppa 
Holdings Ltd., manufacturers of ice-cream and milk processors, 
V. O. Dickie was appointed Minister for Health in 1965. He did 
not resign from the board until 1968 when the company was taken 
over by British Tobacco. R. J. Hamer, Minister for Local Govern­
ment since 1964, accumulated a number of directorships —  Nylex 
Corporation Ltd., Moulded Products (Australasia) Ltd., Yorkshire 
Dyeware and Chemical Co. (Australasia) Pty. Ltd., the Gas Supply 
Co. Ltd., and General Foods Corporation Holdings Ltd. He 
resigned from the board of the Gas Supply Co. Ltd. in February 
1966, when involved in discussions on the future of natural gas
!l The Hrrnld, 13 August 10(>8.
1" The Age, 2!) J a n u a ry  1*169.
"  P la tt , of>. ri!., p . 2<»9.
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in Victoria. In March. 1970. lie also resigned his Nylex director­
ship on the grounds that he had been appointed Acting Minister 
for Public Works. Finally, the Minister for Education, Lindsay 
Thompson, is a director of the Deakin Housing Society. Yet, 
significantly, another director of this company. Peter Howson, MHR, 
has revealed that he resigned his directorship during his term as 
Federal Minister for Air and rejoined the board only after being 
dropped from the Ministry.'-'
The practice of successive Bolte Ministries in permitting Ministers 
to retain or accept directorships has been sharply criticised .>n 
many occasions in editorials in the Melbourne daily press, where 
it has been suggested that Victoria should follow the British and 
Australian Federal practices.'" Bolte says that he is merely 
observing a “local rule”. He believes that his authority is sufficient 
to safeguard the “public interest”. Referring to Ministers who have 
occupied directorships, Bolte told the Legislative Assembly on 
September 17, 1968: “I have accepted sole responsibility for the 
conduct, t<h,e propriety and the honesty of all these Ministers”. Iron­
ically, Victorian Ministers control the activities of State public 
servants and local government councillors in an attempt to prevent 
their private interests conflicting with their public duties. Obviously, 
they have more faith in their own integrity than they have in 
either the public service or their fellow politicians at the local level.
Menzies was largely responsible for bringing Federal practice 
into line with that of Britain, although neither he nor his successors 
have explicitly laid down any rulings on the British pattern.14 In 
the interwar period Menzies was a director of the following com­
panies:
Australian Foundation Investment Co. Ltd. (1929-38).
National Reliance Investment Co. Ltd. (1929-38).
County of Bourke Permanent Building & Investment Society
(1933-39).
Commercial Union Assurance Co. of Australia Ltd., Melbourne
Board (1935-38).
Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd. (1936-39).
Capel Court Investment Co. (Aust.) Ltd. (1936-38).
12 The Australian, 5 March 1970.
13 See e.g.. The Age, 17 September 1968; The Herald, 18 September 1968; The 
Age, 10 March 1970.
n  See John Stubbs. "Keeping MPs Out of Business", The Australian, 14 May 
1966; David Aldridge, “A Question of Direction”, The Suu (Melbourne), 13 
August 1968; Peter Cole-Adanis, "Permissive Politics. Victoria: The Odd Man 
Out", The Age, 9 March 1970.
Jason Investment Co. (Aust.) Ltd. (1937-38).15
It can be seen that he had resigned all his directorships before 
becoming Prime Minister in 1939, but he had held Ministerial posts 
during the thirties, both as Victorian State Attorney-General 1932-34 
and Federal Attorney-General after 1934. Nevertheless, during all 
the periods in which he was Prime Minister, Menzies strictly 
adhered to the British practice. Sir Phillip McBride, on being 
appointed a Minister in 1949, was obliged by Menzies to resign 
no fewer than 33 directorships.10 Moreover, when Sir William 
Spooner was given the portfolio of National Development in 1951, 
hie had to resign 16 directorships17.
The best example of Menzies’ firmness on the question occurred 
in 1958, when Sir Percy Spender, a former Minister in the Menzies 
Government (1949-51) and former Australian Ambassador to the 
United States (1951-58) who had just been appointed a Justice 
of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, was virtually 
forced to resign from the board of the Goodyear Tyre and Rubber 
Co. (Aust.) Ltd. His resignation was tendered after he received 
a tersely-worded letter from Menzies following allegations by E. J. 
Ward in Ch.e House of Representatives on August 26, 1958. 
Strange as it may seem, Menzies appears to have been genuinely 
ignorant of the fact that Spender had been a director of the 
company since 1944.1* After L. H. E. Bury was dismissed as 
Minister for Air in 1962, he joined the boards of Duncan Holdings 
Ltd., Lend Lease Corporation Ltd., and the General Assurance 
Society Ltd., but resigned these directorships upon being appointed 
Minister for Housing in 1963. In March 1962, Sir Allen Fairhall, 
tihen Minister for Supply, was obliged to resign from the board of 
R. & N. Statham Ltd.19 However, he retained the managing 
directorship of Wilken and Jones Pty. Ltd., successful manufacturers 
of dummy models for shop-window displays of women’s clothing.20
Both Holt and Gorton maintained Menzies’ general adherence 
to British norms of behavior regarding company directorships.
13 John Playford, ' Menzies' Big Business Interests", Outlook, April 1962, p. 19.
See also |. X. Rawling. Who Owns Australia! (Sydney: Modern Publishers,
3rd ed., 1938). p. 29.
1,1 S. Encel. Equality and Authority: A Study of ('.lass. Status anil Power in 
Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970). p. 351.
'7 Aldridge, of), rit.
18 Following his retirement from the International Court of Justice in 1967. 
Spender joined the l>oards of Bushdls Investments Ltd.. Rushclls Pty. Ltd.. and 
T he Reader’s Digest Association Pty. Ltd. He also became chairman of Agen 
Holdings Ltd. and Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd.
,!l Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol. H. of R. 34 (15 March 1962), 
p. 844.
Incentive (Canberra), cited in Tribune, II September 1968.
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Gorton informed the House of Representatives on May 29, 1969 
lihat no Ministers were on the boards of public companies, although 
some held directorships in private pastoral companies21 or small 
businesses, but none of these companies had any dealings with any 
Government Department or public instrumentality. Of course, 
many former Liberal and Country Party Ministers assume (or less 
frequently resume) directorships, e.g. at the Federal level: Sir 
Arthur Fadden, Sir Charles Davidson, Sir Neil O'Sullivan, Sir 
William Spooner, Sir Phillip McBride, Sir Allen Fairhall and Sir 
Howard Beale.
At the State political level, a general, if rather uneven, trend 
towards the standards observed in Federal politics may be discerned. 
No Minister in the various Playford administrations in South 
Australia —  apart from the late Sir Cecil Hincks, Minister for 
Lands 1946-53 —  was allowed to retain a company directorship.22 
On joining the Askin Ministry in 1965 as N.S.W. Minister for 
Child Welfare, Minister for Social Welfare, Advisory Minister for 
Transport, and Vice-President of the Executive Council, A. D. 
Bridge*; gave up 65 directorships worth about $60,000 a year.23 
Bridges died in 1968, and his successor as Minister for Child 
Welfare, F. M. Hewitt, had to resign 14 directorships.24 When 
Nicklin became Premier of Queensland in 1957, he instructed all 
Ministers to surrender their directorships. His ruling, however, 
did not apply to share holdings in companies that are intimately 
connected with a Minister’s Department. These problems received 
widespread publicity during the Evans scandal of 1962 and the 
more recent Bjelke-Petersen case.
During October and November 1961, E. Evans, Queensland 
Minister for Mines and Development, bought 2000 Australian Oil 
and Gas shares when the average market price was $2.20. By 
March the market price of AOG shares had risen dramatically and 
his original investment of about $2200 was worth about $20,000. 
It is clear that Evans had used his Ministerial position to advance 
his material interest, but his actions were upheld by the Cabinet. 
Even the staunchly pro-Government Cour:er-Mail declared editor­
ially:
T hat a Minister for Mines should speculate for his personal profit in any
mining enterprise that has to deal with hint as a Minister will still appear
21 In 1966, J. M. Fraser, Minister for the Army, formed a family pastoral 
company — Fraser Properties Pt\. I.td. — with an authorised capital of $700,000 
(The Age, 26 August 1966).
22 The Management Digest (Canberra), 20 February 1968.
23 The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 1968.
24 Ibid., 3 September 1968, 18 September 1968.
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im p ro p e r  to  m an y  peop le , th o u g h  th e  P re m ie r has fo u n d  i t  possib le  to
excuse M r. Evans ‘f lu tte r ' . . . -5
During the Queensland State election campaign in 1969, the 
leader of the Opposition accused Premier Bjelke-Petersen of using 
deceit to acquire “fabulous wealth” from oil share transactions. It 
was also disclosed about the same time that he held half a million 
Exoil NL shares.26 Late last year a new mining company, Bjelke- 
Peterson Pty. Ltd., was established; it was “believed to be associated 
with the Premier of Queensland”.27 During a recent appearance 
on the ABC television program “Four Corners” (March 21, 1970) 
Bjelke-Petersen was brutally frank in expressing the view that he 
saw no conflict between the public office he held and his extensive 
interests in the oil and mining industries.
A controversy involving the South Australian Minister for Local 
Government. Roads and Transport, Murray Hill, who is also a 
leading local estate agent, arose in 1969. The Leader of the 
Opposition, Don Dunstan, claimed that pamphlets bearing the 
name Murray Hill Pty. Ltd. were inviting householders to sell 
their properties through the company. They were being distributed 
to people living in an area affected by plans under the Metro­
politan Adelaide Transportation Study (MATS). Hill was defended 
by Premier Hall in the House of Assembly on August 7, 1969, 
on the ground that he was no longer a director of his company 
and “therefore completely exonerated”. However, as Dunstan was 
quick tn point out, Hill’s financial interest in the company was 
retained and his actions were so open to dubious inference as io 
constitute a grave impropriety. It is also relevant to note here that 
Hill is a director of two public companies —  The Century Insurance 
Co. Ltd., and Friends Provident and Century Life Office.
At the Federal level, there has not been a comprehensive ruling 
on the question of Ministers’ shareholdings. Gorton told the House 
of Representatives on March 4, 1969, that Federal Ministers were 
not prohibited from holding shares in mining companies which 
might apply to the Government for leases. He went on to observe, 
with obvious satisfaction, that the Minister for National Develop­
ment, David Fairbairn, who dealt with mining leases, had sold all 
such shares before taking office. In October 1969, it was revealed 
that Senator M. F. Scott, Minister for Customs and Excise, and 
the Rev. Dr. Malcolm Mackay, Liberal MHR for Evans, had been
-5 Cuurier-Mnil, 16 March 1962. See also Nation, 10 March 1962, 24 March 
1962.
Nation, 22 March I960.
27 The Australian, 15 December 1969.
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involved in a $2 million deal over a manganese mine in north-west 
Australia. Mackay is chairman of Longreach Metals NL, and 
Scott was a major shareholder in Mount Sydney Manganese Pty. 
Ltd. which sold out to Longreach. Scott is also the principal 
vendor in a string of West Australian mining leases.28 It is interesting 
to note here that Scott was recently elected chairman of the Gov­
ernment Members Mining Committee, after being dropped from the 
Gorton Ministry.29 His predecessor was none other than Mackay. 
whom Whitlam once described as having “given up the divine for 
the divining rod” .
Unquestionably, many politicians —  including Ministers —  make 
much more money than would appear possible if they were dependent 
solely on their parliamentary salaries. One journalist recently 
asked:
Was the. any tru th  . . .  in the whispered allegations that a National
Development Minister played the stock market because he knew a lot
about mineral and oil exploration because of his position?''*11
It will be many years before crude bushranger ethics cease to 
dominate important areas of Australian political life.
I ll
Despite the uneven trend in Australia towards upholding the 
norms of behavior required of British Ministers, editorial writers 
and Labor politicians delude themselves when they claim that 
the adoption of a comprehensive ruling along the lines of the one 
in existence in Britain would remove the possibility of a conflict 
of interests. Even if Ministers were to divest themselves of all 
directorships and shareholdings, business and propertied interests 
would still be able to count on their positive and active goodwill.31 
Furthermore, the existence of Labor Ministers has not destroyed 
the validity of such an analysis.32 A  handful of them, of course, 
may have believed that they were not serving capitalist ends but 
thjeir instrumental function in the system has determined otherwise.
28 Sunday Observer, 19 October, 1969, 26 October 1969.
2» The Age, 18 March 1970.
30 Sunday Observer, 15 February 1970.
31 See Ralph Miliband, The Slate in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 68-87; Nicos Poulantzas, "T he Problem of the 
Capitalist State", New Left Review, No. 58, November-December, 1969; Ralph 
Miliband, “T he Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas”, New Left Review, 
No. 59, January-February 1970.
32 Humphrey McQueen, "Laborism and Socialism”, in Richard Gordon (ed.), 
The New Left in Australia (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1970); W. j .  Waters, 
"Labor, Socialism, and World War 11", Labour History, No. 16, May 1969. 
See also Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, pp. 96-117.
(i!)
It is not so much a question of Ministers being consciously 
influenced in their contact wii>i business by ihe possibility of securing 
directorships at some later date. Their personal ties with the 
world of corporate capitalism arc not as important as their world­
view. Beyond all their political, cultural and religious differences. 
Ministers accept as beyond question the capitalist context whic,h 
is of fundamental informance in shaping their attitudes, policies 
and actions to specific issues and problems. They are fundament­
ally committed to capitalist enterprise which is seen as a necessary, 
desirable and "natural” element of Australian society. The various 
ends pursued by the members of Governments are conditioned 
by, and pass through the prism of, their acceptance of and commit­
ment to the existing economic system.
POSTSCRIPT
This article was completed just before the eruption of the Comalco 
shares scandal in May-June, which began when the giant inter­
national mining company offered share allotments in its new issue 
to leading politicians, public servants and financial journalists. 
Prime Minister Gorton personally rejected the preferential offer 
and suggested that other Federal Ministers should follow suit, since 
acceptance of the shares could give the impression that they were 
being singled out for special treatment —  and that would be un­
desirable in the light of C'omalco's dealings with the Government. 
He laid stress on the fact that subscribers to the flotation would 
almost certainly make a quick-scale profit. As it turned out, the 
shares were issued on June 11 at $2.75, yet within minutes they 
had rocketed to $5.80 on the Melbourne Stock Exchange.
Gorton’s advice, however, was not listened to by key members 
of the political executives in several States. In Queensland, for 
ex.ample, six Ministers —  including the Treasurer, the Minister 
for Industrial Development, and the Minister for Works —  received 
thousands of shares as “customers” of Comalco. Other Ministers 
may have taken up the offer through nominee companies or relatives. 
Nevertheless, the Ministers named in the press passionately defended 
their actions, the common refrain being, that it was their own private 
business and that they could make money how and as they wished. 
The Bulletin (June 20) referred to the “thinness" of this type of 
argument: “Politicians with an interest in a company can push 
contracts worth millions to favored ones."
The Comalco scandal is. a reflection, in the crudest form, ot 
how the political executive —  and other elements in the State 
system —  serve the interests of the owners and controllers of 
concentrated economic wealth.
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Antonio Gramsci
Schools and Education
ANTONIO GRAMSCI first gave the notion of hegemony 
its correct place in marxist theories of the exercise of 
political control. According to Gramsci, societal power did 
not rest solely on coercion but on manipulation and con­
sensual agreement between the rulers and the ruled. The 
exact proportion in which coercion and consensus co­
existed depended on which society was examined at which 
stage of history. He thought that in advanced capitalist 
societies and transitional societies, like the Italy he exam­
ined in the early thirties, the emphasis was more and 
more on obtaining consensus through manipulation, rather 
than ruling through coercion. So at least one of his 
central concerns in his research was to establish and 
describe just how the rulers of a society manipulated the 
populace to obtain their agreement in the way society was 
run. Obviously the indoctrination of the young was very 
important. Through the type of schooling which existed 
the rulers could inculcate the values and beliefs necessary 
for the maintenance of their type of social system. Thus 
Gramsci was always very interested in the “Questione 
scolastica” and wrote a number of significant notes on 
schools and their organisation and their role in the instil­
lation of hegemonic values in his prison notes. Only since 
1958 has really significant work on Gramsci’s pedagogical 
theory been done in Italy and practically nothing has 
been done outside his name. What follows is a translation 
of one of his two most important essays on the schooling 
system.
Alastair Davidson
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IN GF.NHRAl. WH CAN Sl-.H that all practical activities have 
become so complex, and sciences so intertwined with life in modern 
society, that every practical activity tends to set up its own school 
lor its own specialists and directing groups and thus to create a 
group ol specialist intellectuals of a higher grade who can teach 
in these schools. I hus, beside the sort of school which we can 
call "humanistic . which is the oldest and most traditional school, 
and which was designed to give every human individual a general 
and even unspecialised education— the fundamental ability to think 
and get along in lile— there has been created an entire system of 
specialist schools of various grades, for whole branches of the 
professions or for already specialised occupations which are pre­
cisely marked out. We could even say that the crisis in education 
which now besets us is tied to the fact that this process of differ­
entiation and specialisation has come about chaotically, without 
clear or precise principles, and without well studied and consciously 
fixed planning: the crisis of educational programming and organi­
sation, that is. the crisis of the general orientation of policy for 
the formation of modern intellectual groups, is in great part an 
aspect and a complication of the more all-enveloping and general 
crisis.
The basic division of schooling into classical and vocational was 
a rational scheme: the vocational school for the instrumental classes 
and the classical school for the ruling classes and the intellectuals. 
The development of an industrial base in both the city and the 
country made increasingly necessary a new type of urban intellectual: 
beside the classical school developed the technical school (vocational 
but not manual). This called into discussion the very principle of 
the concrete orientation of general education, of the humanistic 
orientation of general education based on the greco-roman tradition. 
This orientation, once under discussion, was finished, since its 
formative effectiveness was in great part based on the general 
prestige, which was traditionally not questioned, of a particular type 
of civilisation.
The tendency is today to abolish every type of "disinterested" 
(or not directly tendentious) and “formative” schooling or to leave 
only a reduced sample for a small elite of gentlemen and women 
who do not have to worry about preparing for a professional future 
and to spread the specialised vocational school in which the fate
11'is article on a topic of increasing interest today was translated by Alastair 
Davidson for A I R .  Dr. Davidson is lecturer in Political Science at Monash 
I niversity, member o ftlie Editorial Board of AI  R, and author of The Com­
munist Party of Australia, a Sliml History (reviewed in A IR  Xo. 25).
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of the pupil and his future activity are predetermined more and more. 
The crisis will find a solution which, according to reason, should 
follow these lines: a single primary school for general humanistic, 
formative education, which correctly adjusts the development of the 
capacity to work manually (technically/industrially) and the devel­
opment of capacity to work intellectually. From this type of school 
for all, via repetitious experience of vocational orientation, pupils 
will proceed to one of the specialist schools or into productive work.
We must bear in mind the growing tendency by which every 
practical activity tends to create a specialised school, just as every 
intellectual activity tends to create its own educational club or 
circle, which assumes the function of a post-school institution which 
specialises in organising the conditions which allow men to keep up 
to date with the progress taking place in their own branch of 
knowledge.
We can see that the decision-making organs are tending more 
and more to divide their activity into “organic” aspects: the 
deliberative which is essentially theirs and the technical-educative 
whose problems they have to resolve which are first examined by 
experts and analysed scientifically. This has already created a 
bureaucratic body structured in a new way, since beside the special­
ised offices of those competent to prepare the technical material 
for the decision-making bodies is created a second type of func­
tionary, more or less “volunteers” and disinterested, chosen from 
time to time from industry, the banks and financial world. This 
is one of the mechanisms through which the career bureaucracy has 
ended up controlling democratic and parliamentary regimes; now 
the mechanism is extending itself systematically and is absorbing 
within its ambit the great specialists in private practice, who thus 
control both bureaucracy and regime. Since it is a necessary 
systematic development which tends to integrate persons skilled in 
political techniques with persons skilled in the concrete questions of 
administration of practical activity essential to great and complex 
modern national societies, all efforts to exorcise this tendency from 
the outside have no result but moralistic preaching and rhetorical 
lament.
The question arises of modifying the preparation of technico- 
political personnel, integrating their education with the new neces­
sities and elaborating new types of specialist functionaries who 
collectively can relate the decision-making activity with it. The 
traditional type of political “leader”, who is prepared solely for 
formal law-making functions becomes anachronistic and represents a 
danger to the life of the state: the leader must have a minimum of 
general technical education which permits him, if not to “make’
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the correct solution by himself, to be able to judge the solutions 
ollcrcd him by the experts and thus to choose the correct one from 
the "synthetic” point of view of political technique.
A type of decision-making body which seeks to incorporate the 
necessary technical competence to operate realistically has been 
described in another place [in another essay he wrote] where I 
spoke ol what happens in editorial boards on certain journals, boards 
which function both as boards and cultural clubs. The club criti­
cises collegially and so contributes to the elaboration of the work 
of single editors, whose work is organised according to a plan and a 
division of labor which is rationally apportioned. Through the 
discussion and the collegial criticism (made up of suggestions, advice, 
methodological direction, and criticism which is constructive and 
directed towards mutual education) in which each man acts as a 
specialist in his field to integrate with the collective competency, 
we succeed in reality in raising the average level of individual 
editors, and reaching the height and capacity of the most prepared, 
ensuring not only an ever more close and unified collaboration on 
the review, but creating the conditions for the emergence of a 
homogeneous group of intellectuals who are ready to produce regular 
and methodical bookish publications (not only of occasional publi­
cations and unconnected essays, but of whole works together).
Undoubtedly, in this type of collective activity, all work produces 
new capability and possibilities for work, since it creates more and 
more fundamental conditions for work: indexes, bibliographical 
notes, collections of fundamental specialist works, etc. This calls 
for a strict struggle against habits of amateurism, improvisation, and 
declamatory and oratorical solutions. The work must be done in 
writing especially, just as the criticisms in succinct and concise notes 
must be in writing. This can be achieved through distributing the 
material in time, etc.; the writing of notes and criticism is a 
didactic principle rendered necessary by the need to combat the 
habits of prolixity, declamation and fallacies created by oratory. 
This type of intellectual work is necessary to make the self-taught 
acquire the discipline for study which a regular school career creates, 
to taylorise intellectual work. The principle of the “old men of 
Santa Zita” of which de Sanctis talks in his memoirs of the Neapoli­
tan school of Basilio Puoti is useful: that is, it is useful to have 
a certain “stratification” according to capability and attitude, and 
the formation of work groups under the guide of the more expert 
and advanced, so that the more backward and rough can have their 
preparation speeded up.
An important point in studying the practical organisation of the 
single primary [q.v. supra] school is that regarding schooling in the
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various grades which correspond with the age and the intellectual 
and moral development of the students and the ends which the 
school itself desires to attain. The single or humanistic (under­
standing this term humanistic in the wide and not traditional sense) 
or general education school must intend to usher young people into 
social activity after having taken them up to a certain level of 
maturity and capacity, up to intellectual and practical creativity 
and autonomy in attitudes and initiative. Fixing the compulsory 
school age depends on general economic conditions since these can 
force demands that youth and young men contribute immediately 
to production. The single school demands that the State is able to 
assume the expenses which are today a charge upon each family 
for the maintenance of the pupils, that is, that it transforms the 
education department from top to bottom, extending it and compli­
cating it in an unheard of way: the entire process of education and 
formation of the younger generation becomes public after having 
been private since only in that way can education involve all 
generations without distinction of groups or castes. But this trans­
formation of schooling demands an unheard of enlargement of the 
practical organisation of schools, that is, of buildings, scientific 
material, the teaching body, etc. The teaching body in particular 
must be increased because the fewer the number of pupils to teach 
the greater and more intense efficiency of the school, which raises 
other problems which will not be solved rapidly and easily. Even 
the question of buildings is not simple because this type of school 
must be a college with dormitories, refectories, special libraries, 
rooms suitable for seminar work, etc. Thus, at first the new 
school should not be and will not be for other than limited groups, 
students chosen by competition and placed according to the respon­
sibility of appropriate institutions.
The single primary school should cover the same years as that 
covered today by the elementary and middle schools which have 
been reorganised not only for content and method of teaching, 
but for the distribution of the various grades during schooling. 
The first grade of elementary school should not last for more than 
three or four years, and beside inculcating the first “instrumental” 
notions of learning— reading, writing, arithmetic, geography and 
history— should propound that part of “rights and duties” which 
is neglected today, that is, first notions of the State and Society, 
as primordial elements in a new conception of the world which 
opposes the conceptions given by various traditional social ambients, 
that is, concepts that we can call folkloric. The problem of teaching 
we have to resolve is that of making fruitful and moderating the 
dogmatic tendency which must exist in these early years. The rest 
of the course should not last more than six years, so that at fifteen
to sixteen years all the years of the single primary school should 
be complete.
It could be objected that a course like that is too tiring because of 
its rapidity, if we wish to attain effectively the results which the 
present organisation of the classical school proposes to attain but 
does not. We can say, however, that the complex of the new 
organisation will have to include the general elements through which, 
for some pupils at least, the course is too slow today. What are 
these elements? In certain families, especially in the intellectual 
classes, children find in family life a preparation for, a prolongation 
of, and an integration with school life. They absorb, as the saying 
goes, from the “atmosphere", a great quantity of attitudes and 
beliefs which facilitate schooling properly speaking: they already 
know and develop knowledge of literary language, that is, the 
means of expression and knowledge which are technically superior 
to the means possessed by the average pupil in the school population 
between six and twelve years. Likewise, the pupils of the city, 
because they live in the city, have already absorbed before the age 
of six a number of concepts and attitudes which make schooling more 
easy, profitable and rapid. In the internal organisation of the 
single primary school at least the principal of these conditions must 
be created besides the fact which is presupposed, that alongside the 
single primary school there is developed a network of kindergarten 
and other institutions in which, even before school age, children 
become accustomed to a certain collective discipline and acquire 
preschool notions and attitudes. In fact, the single school shtmld 
be organised as a college, with a collective life day and night 
which is free from the present hypocritical and mechanical present- 
day forms of discipline. Study must be done together, with the 
help o f the masters and better pupils, even during the hours of 
so-called individual study, etc.
The fundamental problem of this phase is raised by the present 
schooling represented by the high school (liceo) which is no way 
different from preceding years of schooling as a type of teaching 
except for the abstract supposition that there is a higher intellectual 
and moral maturity in the pupil which is in conformity to the 
greater age and the experience which has already been accumulated.
In fact there is a jump between high-school and university, that 
is, between what is a school truly speaking and what is life. . . 
From teaching what is purely dogmatic, in which the memory plays 
a large part, one passes to a phase of creative pr autonomous and 
independent work; from school where study is imposed and controlled 
in an authoritative fashion, one passes to a phase of study or pro­
fessional work in which intellectual self-discipline and moral autonomy
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is theoretically unlimited. And it comes straight after puberty, 
when the surge of instinctive and elementary passions has not yet 
finished grappling with the brakes of character and moral con­
sciousness which are being formed. In Italy, where in the university 
the principle of tutorial work is still not widespread, the transition 
is even more brusque and mechanical.
This is why the final period in the single school must be conceived 
of, and organised as, a final phase in which we tend to create the 
fundamental values of “humanism”, intellectual self-discipline and 
moral autonomy necessary for further specialisation either of a 
scientific character (university studies) or of a more immediate 
practical and productive nature (industry, bureaucracy, organisation 
of exchange, etc.). The study and learning of creative methods 
in science and life must begin in this last phase of school and no 
longer be a monopoly of the university or be left to chance in real 
life: this phase of school must contribute to develop the element 
of autonomous responsibility in the individual, to be a creative 
school. It is necessary to make a distinction between the active 
and creative schooling, as in the Dalton method. The single school 
is active schooling throughout, even though it may be necessary 
to place limits on libertarian theories in this field and emphasise 
with some energy the duty of adult generations, that is, the duty of 
the State, to make younger generations “conform”. We are still 
in the romantic phase with active schooling in which the elements 
of the struggle against mechanical and jesuitical learning have 
become unhealthily inflated by contrast and in polemic: we must 
go into the “classical” rational phase and find in the ends to be 
reached the natural springs for the elaboration of methods and 
forms.
Creative schooling crowns active schooling: in the first phase 
we tend to discipline and thus to level in order to obtain a certain 
sort of “conformity” which we can dub “dynamic”; in the creative 
phase, on the basis of “collectivisation” of a social sort, we tend 
to expand the personality, which has become autonomous and 
responsible, but with a solid and homogeneous moral and social 
conscience. Thus creative schooling does not mean an “inventing 
and discovering” school; it indicates a phase and method of research 
and knowledge, and not a “programme” in which is predetermined 
an obligation to be original and to innovate at all costs. It indi­
cates that learning comes especially through a spontaneous and 
independent effort of the learner, in which the master has only the 
function of a friendly guide like that which exists or should exist 
in Universities. To discover a truth by oneself, without suggestions 
or outside help, is to create even if the truth is an old one. It also 
shows methodological ability; it shows that in every way the pupil
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has entered the phase ol intellectual maturity in which new truths 
can be discovered. Therefore fundamental school activity in this 
phase takes place in seminars, libraries and experimental laborator­
ies; in it the fundamental preparation for professional occupations 
take place.
The advent of the single school signifies the beginning of new 
relations between intellectual work and industrial work "not only 
in the school but in all social life. The principle of unity will be 
reflected tor that reason in all cultural organs, transforming them 
and giving them new content.
I he problem of the new function which universities and 
Academies can have.
I oday these two institutions are independent of one another 
and the Academies are the symbol, frequently derisory, of the lack 
of connection between high culture and life, between the intel­
lectuals and the populace (thus the fortune which the futurists had 
in their first period of anti-academic and anti-traditional Sturm 
und Drang, ctc.).
In a new situation of relations between life and learning, between 
intellectual and industrial work, the Academies should become the 
cultural (systematising, expanding and creating intellectually) organi­
sations of those people who, after their single schooling, pass into 
work in the professions and a field of contact between them and 
university teachers. Social elements employed in the professions 
must not fall into intellectual passivity, but must have at their 
disposition (through collective initiative and not through individuals, 
as a fundamental social function recognised as of public necessity 
and usefulness) specialised institutes in all branches of research 
and scientific work, in which they can collaborate and in which 
they can find all the subsidies necessary for every form of cultural' 
activity which they intend to undertake.
Academic organisations will have to be reorganised and revivified 
from top to bottom. Territorially they will have a centralisation 
of specialisations and competencies: national centres will be composed 
ot the existing great institutions, regional and provincial sections 
of local, urban and rural clubs. They will be divided up according 
to cultural and scientific competency, and will all be represented 
in the higher centres but only partially in the local clubs. Unify 
the various types of existing cultural organisations Academies, 
Cultural Institutes, philological circles, etc., integrating them with 
traditional academic work which consists mainly of systemising past 
knowledge and seeking to fix the norm in national thought as a
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guide for intellectual activity, with activity tied to collective life, 
to the world of production and work. Industrial conferences, 
scientific organisation of work, and experimental factory cabinets 
will be controlled, etc. A mechanism will be constructed to 
select and advance the individual capacity of the popular masses, 
which are sacrificed today and lost through mistakes and dead-end 
efforts. Every local club should be obliged to have a moral and 
scientific section, and gradually should organise other special sections 
to discuss the technical aspects of labor, in the factory, office and 
field, etc. Periodic congresses at various levels will make the 
most able people known.
It would be useful to have a complete list of all the Academies 
and other cultural organisations which exist today and arguments 
which they deal with most in their w'ork and which are published 
in their “Reports”: in a great part it is a question of cemeteries of 
learning, but even these have a role in the psychology of the ruling 
class.
The collaboration between these organs and the universities should 
be close, like that of all higher specialist schools of every sort 
(military, naval, etc.). The aim is to obtain a centralisation and 
an impulse to the national learning superior to that of the Catholic 
Church.*
* This scheme of organisation of cultural work according 10 the general 
principles of the single primary school should be developed accurately in all 
its parts and serve as a guide in the constitution of even the most elementary 
and primitive centre of learning, which should be conceived of as an embryo 
and molecule of the whole massive structure. Even initiatives which are 
transitory and experimental should be conceived of as being capable of absorption 
into the general scheme and at the same time as vital elements which tend 
to create the whole scheme. The organisation and development of the Rotary 
clubs is to be studied.
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THE ARMIES OF THE 
NIGHT, by Norman Mailer. 
Penguin Books, 300 pp., $1.30.
THE VIETNAM MORATORIUM in 
\ites the famous American author. Mr. 
Norman Mailer, to attend the Septem­
ber demonstration. Would he mind 
sharing the platlonn with Jane Fonda 
and dear old l)r. Spock, hero of the 
I Ionian's Day set, toilet-trainer extra­
ordinaire? How aljout a clash of Dr. 
Cairns to top it off? And will Norm 
write a book about it — about the de­
monstrators. and his role in the whole 
deal, and how the Daily Telegraph mis­
represented him. and the relationship 
between shit and Dr. Spock. and some 
insights into the psychology of Jane 
Konda, Tim e pin up girl? And what 
will he say about poor old Jim . . .
We could tind out. one day, perhaps. 
In the meantime however we have The 
Armies of the Might, Mailer's account 
of the Washington anti-Vietnam de­
monstration of October 1967. It's more 
than an account of a political demon­
stration, it's a deep and tortured look 
at a sick society; "America, once a 
beauty of magnificence unparclleled. 
now a beauty with a leprous skin."
Mailer is a complex man. He's been 
to the further shores of Hell, and back, 
stabbing one of his wives, consuming 
drugs and alcohol, burning holes in his 
brain until, in his words, his head had 
taken on "the texture of a fine Sw'iss 
cheese". Vet he has retained a hold 
011 life and not slipped off the razor's 
edge. This he achieved via writing — 
novels, journalism, essays, poetry — 
putting into words his own concept 
of life and the truths that have been 
revealed to him.
An egotist to be sure. Mailer is the 
hero of this work. But he deals with 
himself in the same tough-minded 
sharp way that he deals with others. 
He catalogues his hangups. He likes
his sex to be guilt-ridden; he is a neo- 
Victorian. And if lie's cruel to others 
then lie's cruel to himself as well. I t’s 
a kind of existential therapy. Just write 
it like it is.
Hi’ blasts his way through the Amer­
ican Peace Movement, past the liberal 
academic opponents of the war whose 
only quarrel with the Great Society is 
that they think it temporarily derang­
ed, jabs a couple of Oscar Wilde rights 
to left personalities like Paul Good­
man. Dwight Macdonald, frames the 
American Communist Party in a brief 
few lines, the spiritual deadness of its 
dull old manipulating calculations, and 
dashes on commenting left and right, 
the New Left, sex, Black Power, mor­
ality, tactics, revolution, violence, tele­
vision. history, American life, values, 
cops, Vietnam . . .
"1 he death of America rides in on 
the smog”. This is also what Mailer 
writes about; the death of America, 
the death of the society that set out 
to be the new Jerusalem, "the land 
where a new kind of man was born 
from the idea that God was present 
in every man not only as compassion 
but as power . . ." And it's dying in 
a schizophrenic frenzy where hate and 
power come together, where war and 
sex meet, becoming interchangeable; 
and the Vietnam war becomes the huge 
production of Christianity gone wrong 
and its aberrations (the twisted na- 
palmed kids, the frightened young men 
shooting at the shadows of dark trees 
in the darker jungles) are the manifes­
tations of sex gone sour in a society 
that's shot holes in the minds of its 
children, stifling them, crippling them, 
showing them reality in the TV com­
mercial. This is what Mailer's about.
Ami the real hero of it all is not 
Mailer but the dissenting people of 
America of which Mailer is part.
R. J. C a h i i . i .
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